

THE

DAIRY AND FOOD LAWS

OF THE

STATE OF MICHIGAN

WITH

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

RELATING THERETO

APRIL 1, 1905

COMPILED AT THE OFFICE OF THE
DAIRY AND FOOD DEPARTMENT

LANSING, MICHIGAN
WYNKOOP HALLENBECK CRAWFORD CO., STATE PRINTERS
1905

LAWS OF MICHIGAN

RELATIVE TO INSPECTION AND ADULTERATION OF FOODS

POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE COMMISSIONER

AN ACT to provide for the appointment of a Dairy and Food Commissioner, and to define his powers and duties and fix his compensation.

(Act No. 211, Public Acts, 1893.)

1. (C. L., 4973) Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* That within thirty days after this act shall take effect, the Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, shall appoint a suitable person to be Dairy and Food Commissioner, which office is hereby created, and which commissioner so appointed shall hold his office until the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, and until his successor is appointed and qualified. At the next regular session of the legislature and every two years thereafter, the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a Dairy and Food Commissioner, who shall hold his office for the term of two years from the first day of January in the year of his appointment and until his successor is appointed and qualified.

2. (C. L., 4974) Sec. 2. The Governor shall have power to remove such commissioner at any time in his discretion; but the reasons for such removal shall be laid before the Senate at the next regular or special session of the legislature thereafter, and in case of a vacancy in the

office of commissioner from any cause, the Governor may appoint another person to fill the same.

3. (C. L., 4975) Sec. 3. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the person so appointed shall make, subscribe, and file in the office of the Secretary of State, an oath of office in the form prescribed by section one of article eighteen of the constitution of this State, and shall enter into bonds with the people of the State of Michigan in the sum of ten thousand dollars, with sureties to be approved by the Governor, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties.

4. (C. L., 4976) Sec. 4. Said commissioner shall receive an annual salary of two thousand dollars. The said commissioner is hereby authorized and empowered, by and with the advice and consent of the Governor, to appoint a deputy commissioner. The salary of the deputy commissioner shall be fifteen hundred dollars per annum. The said commissioner may also appoint eight regular inspectors, who shall receive an annual salary not to exceed one thousand dollars per year, and such other special inspectors as the proper performance of the duties of the office may require, which special inspectors shall be paid not to exceed three dollars per day for time actually employed: Provided, That the amount paid such special inspectors any one fiscal year shall not exceed six thousand dollars. The persons so appointed shall have power to administer oaths in all matters relative to the dairy and food laws and shall take and subscribe the constitutional oath of office and file the same in the office of the Secretary of State; and they shall hold office during the pleasure of the commissioner. The inspectors shall have the same right of access to the places to be inspected as the said commissioner or his deputy. The commissioner shall appoint such clerks as he may deem necessary for the transaction of the business of his office. The salaries and expenses authorized by this section shall be for the unexpired part of the fiscal year ending June thirty, nineteen hundred five, and each fiscal year thereafter. Said salaries are to be paid monthly on the warrant of the Auditor General. The actual and necessary expenses of the com-

missioner, deputy and inspectors, in the performance of their official duties, shall be audited by the State Board of Auditors and paid upon the warrant of the Auditor General. Such compensation and expenses shall be certified, audited and paid in the same manner as salaries and expenses paid similar officers. The deputy commissioner and inspectors shall enter into bonds with the people of the State of Michigan in the sum of five thousand dollars each, with sureties to be approved by the commissioner, conditioned for the faithful performance of their respective duties. The Board of State Auditors shall provide office room, and the necessary furniture and fixtures and the necessary stationery, supplies and printing for the conducting of the business of said commissioner, on his application to said board therefor. Said office shall be and remain in the city of Lansing.

[Am. by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 154, P. A. 1897. Am. by Act No. 186, P. A. 1901. Am. by Act No. 230, P. A. 1903. Am. by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

5. (C. L., 4977) Sec. 5. The commissioner, by and with the consent of the Governor, shall appoint a suitable and competent person as State analyst, who shall be a practical analytical chemist. The commissioner, in like manner, may appoint an assistant chemist. Before entering upon the duties of their offices, the analyst and assistant chemist shall take, subscribe and file in the office of the Secretary of State the constitutional oath of office. Their term of office shall continue during the pleasure of the commissioner. The Board of State Auditors shall provide a room in connection with the Dairy and Food Commissioner for the laboratory of the State analyst and his assistant, and the necessary furniture and fixtures therefor. In case of the absence or inability of the State analyst or his assistant to perform his duty, the commissioner may appoint some competent person to perform the same temporarily, which person shall take, subscribe and file the constitutional oath of office. The salaries and expenses authorized by this section shall be for the unexpired part of the fiscal year ending June thirty, nine-

teen hundred five, and each fiscal year thereafter, said salaries to be payable monthly on the warrant of the Auditor General. The salary of the chemist shall be not to exceed two thousand dollars; the salary of the assistant chemist shall be not to exceed twelve hundred dollars. The actual and necessary expenses of the chemist and the assistant chemist, in the performance of their official duties, shall be audited by the Board of State Auditors, and paid upon the warrant of the Auditor General. Such an amount as is found to be necessary in the proper performance of the work of the analyst may be expended for chemical supplies. Such compensations, expenses and supplies shall be certified, audited and paid in the same manner as the salaries, expenses and supplies of similar officers.

[Am. by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 154, P. A. 1897. Am. by Act No. 186, P. A. 1901. Am. by Act No. 230, P. A. 1903. Am. by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

6. (C. L., 4978) Sec. 6. It shall be the duty of the Dairy and Food Commissioner to carefully inquire into the dairy and food and drink products and the several articles which are foods or drinks, or the necessary constituents of foods or drinks, which are manufactured or sold or exposed or offered for sale in this State, and he may, in a lawful manner, procure samples of the same and direct the State analyst to make due and careful examination of the same, and report to the commissioner the result of the analysis of all and any of such food and drink products or dairy products as are adulterated, impure or unwholesome in contravention of the laws of this State; and it shall be the duty of the commissioner to make a complaint against the manufacturer or vendor thereof in the proper county and furnish all evidence thereof, to obtain a conviction of the offense charged. The Dairy and Food Commissioner, or his deputy, or any person appointed by him for that purpose may make complaint and cause proceedings to be commenced against any person for the enforcement of any of the laws relative to adulterated, impure or unwholesome food or drink, and in such case he shall not be obliged to furnish security for costs and shall have power, in the performance of his duties, to enter

into any creamery, factory, store, salesroom, drug store, or laboratory, or place where he has reason to believe food or drink is made, stored, sold or offered for sale and open any cask, tub, jar, bottle or package containing, or supposed to contain, any article of food or drink and examine or cause to be examined the contents thereof, and take therefrom samples for analysis. The person making such inspection shall take such sample of such article or product in the presence of at least one witness, and he shall, in the presence of said witness, mark or seal such sample and shall tender at the time of taking to the manufacturer or vendor of such product, or to the person having the custody of the same, the value thereof, and a statement in writing for the taking of such sample. Whenever it is determined by the Dairy and Food Commissioner, his deputy or inspectors, that filthy or unsanitary conditions exist or are permitted to exist in the operation of any bakery, confectionary, or ice cream plant, or in any place where any food or drink products are manufactured, stored, deposited or sold for any purpose whatever, the proprietor or proprietors, owner or owners, of such bakery, confectionary or ice cream plant, or any person or persons owning or operating any plant where any food or drink products are manufactured, stored, deposited or sold, shall be first notified and warned by the commissioner, his deputy or inspectors to place such bakery, confectionary or ice cream plant, or any place where any food or drink products are manufactured, stored, deposited or sold in a sanitary condition within a reasonable length of time; and any person or persons owning and operating any bakery, confectionary or ice cream plant or any place where any food or drink products are manufactured, stored, deposited or sold, failing to obey such notice and warning, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than three hundred dollars and costs of prosecution, or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed ninety days, or until such fine and costs are paid, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

[Am. by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 154, P. A. 1897. Am. by Act No. 268, P. A. 1899. Am. by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

7. (C. L., 4979) Sec. 7. The commissioner, his deputy or any person by said commissioner duly appointed for that purpose, is authorized at all times to seize and take possession of any and all food and dairy products, substitutes therefor, or imitation thereof kept for sale, exposed for sale or held in possession or under the control of any person which in the opinion of the said commissioner, or his deputy or such person by him duly appointed, shall be contrary to the provisions of this act or other laws which now exist or which may be hereafter enacted.

First, The person so making such seizure as aforesaid, shall take from such goods as seized a sample for the purpose of analysis and shall cause the remainder thereof to be boxed and sealed and shall leave the same in the possession of the person from whom they were seized, subject to such disposition as shall hereafter be made thereof according to the provisions of this act.

Second, The person so making such seizure, shall forward the sample so taken to the State Analyst for analysis, who shall make an analysis of the same and shall certify the results of such analysis, which certificate shall be prima facie evidence of the fact or facts therein certified to in any court where the same may be offered in evidence.

Third, If upon such analysis it shall appear that said food or dairy products are adulterated, substitutes or imitations within the meaning of this act, said commissioner, or his deputy or any person by him duly authorized may make complaint before any justice of the peace or police justice having jurisdiction in the city, village or township where such goods were seized, and thereupon said justice of the peace shall issue his summons to the person from whom said goods were seized, directing him to appear not less than six nor more than twelve days from the date of the issuing of said summons and show cause why said goods should not be condemned and disposed of. If the said person from whom said goods were seized cannot be found said summons shall be served upon the person then in possession of the goods. The said summons shall be served at least six days before the time of appearance mentioned therein. If the person from whom said goods

were seized cannot be found, and no one can be found in possession of said goods, and the defendants shall not appear on the return day, then said justice of the peace shall proceed in said cause in the same manner provided by law where a writ of attachment is returned not personally served upon any of the defendants and none of the defendants shall appear upon the return day.

Fourth, Unless cause to the contrary thereof is shown, or if said goods shall be found upon trial to be in violation of any of the provisions of this act or other laws which now exist or which may be hereafter enacted, it shall be the duty of said justice of the peace or police justice to render judgment that said seized property be forfeited to the State of Michigan, and that the said goods be destroyed or sold by the said commissioner for any purpose other than to be used for food. The mode of procedure before said justice shall be the same, as near as may be as in civil proceedings before justices of the peace. Either parties may appeal to the circuit court as appeals are taken from justices' courts, but it shall not be necessary for the people to give any appeal bond.

Fifth, The proceeds arising from any such sale shall be paid into the State treasury and credited to the general fund: *Provided*, That if the owner or party claiming the property or goods so declared forfeited can produce and prove a written guaranty of purity, signed by the wholesaler, jobber, manufacturer or other party from whom said articles were purchased, then the proceeds of the sale of such articles, over and above the costs of seizure, forfeiture, and sale, shall be paid over to such owner or claimant to reimburse him, to the extent of such surplus, for his actual loss resulting from such seizure and forfeiture, as shown by the invoice.

Sixth, It shall be the duty of each prosecuting attorney when called upon by said commissioners or by any person by him authorized as aforesaid, to render any legal assistance in his power in proceedings under the provisions of this act, or any subsequent act relative to the adulteration of food, for the sale of impure or unwholesome food or food products.

[Am. by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 268, P. A. 1899. Am. by Act No. 230, P. A. 1903.]

8. (C. L., 4980) Sec. 8. It shall be unlawful for the State Analyst, while he holds his office to furnish to any individual, firm or corporation, any certificate as to the purity or excellence of any article manufactured or sold by them to be used as food or in the preparation of food.

9. (C. L., 4981) Sec. 9. The commissioner shall make an annual report to the Governor on or before the first day of July in each year, and which shall be printed and published on or before the first day of September next thereafter, which report shall cover the doings of his office for the preceding fiscal year, which shall show, among other things, the number of manufactories and other places inspected and by whom, the number of specimens of food articles analyzed, and the State Analyst's report upon each one; the number of complaints entered against persons for violation of the laws relative to the adulteration of food, the number of convictions had, and the amount of fines imposed therefor, together with such recommendations relative to the statutes in force as his experience may justify. The commissioner shall also prepare, print and distribute to all the papers of the State, and to such persons as may be interested or may apply therefor, a monthly bulletin, in suitable paper covers, containing results of inspections, the results of analyses made by the State Analyst, with popular explanation of the same, and such other information as may come to him in his official capacity relating to the adulteration of food and drink products and of dairy products, so far as he may deem the same of benefit and advantage to the public; also a brief summary of all the work done during the month by the commissioner and his assistants in the enforcement of the laws of the State, but not more than ten thousand copies of each such monthly bulletin shall be printed.

[Am. by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 154, P. 1897. Am. by Act No. 268, P. A. 1899.]

10. (C. L., 4982) Sec. 10. Any person who shall wilfully hinder or obstruct the Dairy and Food Commissioner, or his deputy or other person or inspector by him duly authorized, in the exercise of the powers conferred

upon him by this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ten days nor more than ninety days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

[Added by Act No. 245, 1895.]

11. (C. L., 4983) Sec. 11. The sum of thirty-five thousand dollars is hereby appropriated for the fiscal year ending June thirty, nineteen hundred six, and for each fiscal year thereafter, there is hereby appropriated the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars. Out of the amounts appropriated by this act shall be paid all salaries and expenses and chemical supplies provided for therein: Provided, That all expenses for stationery and printing shall be audited and paid in the same manner as other State printing and stationery.

[Added by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 154, P. A. 1897. Am. by Act No. 268, P. A. 1899. Am. by Act No. 186, P. A. 1901. Am by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

12. (C. L., 4984) Sec. 12. The Auditor General is hereby directed to annually add to and incorporate into the State tax, to be levied each year, the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars, which, when collected, shall be credited to the general fund to reimburse the same for the money appropriated by this act.

[Added by Act No. 245, P. A. 1895. Am. by Act No. 154, P. A. 1897. Am. by Act No. 268, P. A. 1899. Am. by Act No. 186, P. A. 1901. Am. by Act No. 230, P. A. 1903. Am. by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

13. Sec. 13. It shall also be the duty of the Dairy and Food Commissioner to foster and encourage the dairy industry of the State, and, for that purpose, he shall investigate the general conditions of the creameries, cheese factories, condensed milk factories, skimming stations, milk stations and farm dairies in this State, with full power to enter upon any premises for such investigation, with the object in view of improving the quality and creating and

maintaining uniformity of the dairy products of the State; and should it become necessary, in the judgment of the Dairy and Food Commissioner, he may cause instruction to be given in any creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, skimming station, milk station, or farm dairy, or in any locality in this State, and in order to secure the proper feeding and care of cows, or the practical operation of any plant producing dairy products, and in order to secure such a uniform and standard quality of dairy products in this State, he shall furnish a sufficient number of competent inspectors, the appointment of whom is provided for in section four of this act, and they shall be duly qualified to act as such inspectors.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

14. Sec. 14. Whenever it is determined by the Dairy and Food Commissioner, his deputy or inspectors, that any person is using, selling or furnishing to any skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, milk depot, farm dairy, milk dealer, the retail trade or to any consumer of milk, any impure or unwholesome milk or cream, which impurity or unwholesomeness is caused by the unsanitary or filthy condition of the premises where cows are kept, or by the unsanitary or filthy care or handling of the cows, or from the use of unclean utensils or from unwholesome food, or from any other cause, the person so using, selling or furnishing to any skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, milk depot, farm dairy, milk dealer, the retail trade, or to any consumer of milk, any such milk or cream, shall first be notified and warned by the commissioner, his deputy or inspectors not to use, sell, or furnish such milk or cream to such skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, milk depot, farm dairy, milk dealer, the retail trade, or to any consumer of milk, and any person failing to obey such notice and warning, and continuing to use, sell or furnish to any skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, farm dairy, milk dealer or to the retail trade such impure or unwholesome milk or cream, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon

conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not less than ten dollars, nor more than fifty dollars, and costs of prosecution, or imprisonment in the county jail, not to exceed ninety days, or until such fine and costs are paid, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

15. Sec. 15. Whenever it is determined by the Dairy and Food Commissioner, his deputy or inspectors, that unsanitary conditions exist or are permitted to exist in the operation of any skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, milk depot, or farm dairy, the proprietor or proprietors, or manager of said skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory or farm dairy, shall be first notified and warned by the commissioner, his deputy or inspectors to place such skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, milk depot or farm dairy in a sanitary condition, within a reasonable length of time; and any person or persons owning or operating such skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory, milk depot, or farm dairy, failing to obey such notice and warning, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than three hundred dollars, and costs of prosecution, or imprisonment in the county jail, not to exceed ninety days or until such fine and costs are paid, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

16. Sec. 16. It shall be the duty of the proprietor or proprietors of every skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory or milk depot, in the State where milk or cream is received by purchase or otherwise from three or more persons, to register with the Dairy and Food Commissioner on or before April first of each year, upon blanks furnished by said official, the location of such skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed

milk factory or milk depot, and the name of its owner or owners and manager. And it shall be the duty of the proprietor or proprietors of every skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory or milk depot in this State, where milk or cream is received by purchase or otherwise from three or more persons, to file a report with the Dairy and Food Commissioner, said report to be made on or before April first of each year, upon blanks furnished by said official, and to show the amount of milk or cream received by said skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory or milk depot during the year ending December thirty-first preceding; and said report shall show the amount of butter, cheese or condensed milk manufactured during the year, together with a list of the names and postoffice addresses of the patrons of said skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory or milk depot. Every skimming station, creamery, cheese factory, condensed milk factory or milk depot, so registering and so reporting, shall pay to the office of the State Dairy and Food Commissioner an annual registration fee of five dollars, to be paid at the time of such registration. The money so collected by the Dairy and Food Commissioner shall be paid into the State treasury and be used to help defray the expenses of the office of the Dairy and Food Commissioner, in addition to the annual appropriation therefor.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

17. Sec. 17. Any person, persons or corporation who shall sell milk or cream from a wagon or other conveyance, depot or store, or who shall sell or deliver milk or cream to a hotel, restaurant, boarding house or any public place, shall be considered a milk dealer; and every milk dealer who shall sell milk or cream from a wagon or other conveyance, depot or store, or who shall sell, or deliver milk or cream to a hotel, restaurant, boarding house or any public place in any city, town or village of this State, must first obtain a license from the Dairy and Food Commissioner to sell such milk or cream. A license shall be required for each wagon or other conveyance, depot or store. Each

dealer shall pay to the Dairy and Food Commissioner a license fee of one dollar for each license so granted, which license must be obtained on or before the first day of July of each year. The moneys received by the Dairy and Food Commissioner, in payment of such licenses, shall be paid into the State treasury and be used to help defray the expenses of the office of the Dairy and Food Commissioner in addition to the annual appropriation. All licenses shall be used only in the name of the owner of the wagon, depot or store, and shall, for the purpose of this act, be prima facie evidence of ownership. No license shall be sold, assigned, or transferred. Each license shall record the name, residence, place of business, number of wagons, depots or stores used (where more than one is employed) and the number of the license. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section, in so far as relates to registration and the securing of licenses, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every offense shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars, nor more than twenty-five dollars and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than thirty days, or both.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

18. Sec. 18. Any manufacturer, company, person or persons who shall sell, offer or expose for sale or for distribution, in this State, any concentrated commercial feeding stuff used for feeding live stock, shall furnish with each car, or other amounts shipped in bulk, and shall affix to every package of such feeding stuff, in a conspicuous place, on the outside thereof, a plainly printed statement, clearly and truly certifying the number of net pounds in the car or package sold or offered for sale, the name or trademark under which the article is sold, the name of the manufacturer or shipper, the place of manufacture, the place of business, and a chemical analysis, stating the percentages it contains of crude protein, crude fibre, nitrogen, free extract and ether extract, all constituents to be determined by the methods adopted by the association of official agricultural chemists. Whenever any feeding stuff

is sold at retail, in bulk or in packages belonging to the purchaser, the agent or dealer shall furnish to him a certified copy of the chemical analysis named in this section.

(a) The term concentrated commercial feeding stuffs as used in this act shall include linseed meal, cotton seed meal, pea meals, cocoanut meals, gluten meals, oil meals of all kinds, gluten feeds, maize feeds, starch feeds, mixed sugar feeds, hominy feeds, rice meals, oat feeds, corn and oat feeds, meat meals, dried blood, clover meals, mixed feeds of all kinds, slaughter house waste products; also all condimental stock foods, patented and proprietary stock foods, claimed to possess nutritive properties and all other materials intended for feeding to domestic animals: Provided, That such feeding stuffs, as defined above, shall not include hays, straws, fodders, ensilage, the whole seeds nor the unmixed meals made directly from the entire grains of wheat, rye, barley, oats, flax-seed, maize, buckwheat, wet brewers' grains, malt sprouts, wet or dried beet pulp when unmixed with other materials. Neither shall it include wheat, rye and buckwheat brans or middlings not mixed with other substances, but sold separately as distinct articles of commerce, nor pure grains ground together.

(b) Before any manufacturer, company, person or persons shall sell, offer or expose for sale in this State any concentrated commercial feeding stuff, he or they shall, for each and every feeding stuff bearing a distinguishing name or trade-mark, file annually, with the Dairy and Food Commissioner a certified copy of the chemical analysis and certificate referred to in this section, and shall deposit with said Dairy and Food Commissioner a sealed glass jar, or bottle, containing at least one pound of the feeding stuff to be sold or offered for sale, together with an affidavit that it is a fair sample of the article thus to be sold or offered for sale. He or they shall also pay annually into the State treasury a license fee of twenty dollars for each and every brand of feeding stuff he offers or exposes for sale in this State. Said fee is to be paid on or before April first of each year: Provided, That whenever the manufacturer or importer shall have paid this

license fee, his agents shall not be required to do so. Whenever any manufacturer, importer, agent or seller of any commercial feeding stuff desires at any time to sell such material and has not paid the license fee therefor, he shall pay the license fee prescribed in this section, before making any such sale. The money collected under the provisions of this act shall be paid into the State treasury and be used to help defray the expenses of the office of the Dairy and Food Commissioner, in addition to the regular appropriation therefor.

(c) Whenever the manufacturer, importer, agent or seller of any commercial feeding stuff shall have complied with the requirements of this section, the Dairy and Food Commissioner shall issue or cause to be issued, a license, permitting the sale of said feeding stuff, which license shall terminate on April first following the date of issue.

(d) All such analyses of commercial feeding stuffs required by this act, shall be made under the direction of the Dairy and Food Commissioner, and shall be paid for out of the funds arising from the license fees provided for in this section.

(e) The Dairy and Food Commissioner shall publish, or cause to be published in bulletin form, at least annually a correct statement of all analyses made, together with any incidental information concerning same which he may deem proper.

(f) Any manufacturer, importer, company, agent, person or persons, who shall sell, offer or expose for sale, without first complying with the provisions of this act, any commercial feeding stuff, or shall attach or cause to be attached to any car, package or other quantity of said feeding stuff, an analysis stating that it contains a larger percentage of any one or more of the constituents named in this section than it really does contain shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than one hundred dollars for the first offense, and not less than three hundred dollars for every subsequent offense, and the offender shall also be liable for damages sustained by the purchaser of such feeding stuff on account of such misrepresentation.

(g) The Dairy and Food Commissioner, by any duly

authorized agent, is hereby authorized to select from any package of commercial or other feeding stuff exposed or offered for sale in this State, a quantity not exceeding two pounds for a sample, such sample to be used for the purposes of an official analysis and for comparison with the certificate filed with the Dairy and Food Commissioner, and with the certificate affixed to the package on sale.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

19. Sec. 19. The published annual report of the Dairy and Food Commissioner which shall be made to the Governor, shall include a complete accounting of all moneys received by the department from every source, and the amount expended by the department.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

20. Sec. 20. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act so far as they are inconsistent are hereby repealed.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

[Added by Act No. 49, P. A. 1905.]

AN ACT in relation to the powers and duties of the Dairy and Food Commissioner of the State of Michigan.

(Act No. 167, Public Acts, 1899.)

21. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact*, That any person who shall obstruct the Dairy and Food Commissioner, or his deputy, or any of his duly appointed inspectors, by refusing to allow him entrance to any place where he is authorized to enter in the discharge of his official duty, or refuses to deliver to him a sufficient sample for the analysis of any article of food or drink sold, offered or exposed for sale, or in his possession for the purpose of sale, wherever the same may be found, when the

same is requested and when the value thereof is tendered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars or more than one hundred dollars and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten days or more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, for each and every offense.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

AN ACT for the prevention and suppression of foul brood among bees in the State of Michigan, and the inspection thereof, and to make an appropriation therefor, and to repeal act number one hundred forty-one of the public acts of eighteen hundred eighty-one, being sections fifty-six hundred sixty-three, fifty-six hundred sixty-four, fifty-six hundred sixty-five, fifty-six hundred sixty-six, fifty-six hundred sixty-seven, fifty-six hundred sixty-eight, fifty-six hundred sixty-nine and fifty-six hundred seventy of the compiled laws of eighteen hundred ninety-seven.

(Act No. 66, Public Acts, 1901.)

22. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* The Dairy and Food Commissioner upon receipt of a certified copy of the record of the Michigan State Beekeepers' Association, by the secretary of said association, showing that a majority of the members of said association recommended the appointment of an inspector of apiaries, shall appoint a State inspector of apairies. Said inspector shall be responsible to the Dairy and Food Commissioner and shall comply with such rules and regulations as the Dairy and Food Commissioner shall from time to time prescribe for the carrying out of the work of said State inspector.

23. Sec. 2. The Dairy and Food Commissioner shall, when notified in writing by the owner of an apiary or by three disinterested tax payers in the vicinity of the apiary, cause the inspector to examine such apiaries as are re-

ported and all others in the same locality not reported, and ascertain whether or not the disease known as foul brood or other contagious disease exists in such apiaries, and if satisfied of the existence of foul brood, he shall give the owner or caretaker of the diseased apiaries full instructions how to treat said case as in the inspector's judgment seems best.

24. Sec. 3. The inspector who shall be the sole judge may visit all diseased apiaries a second time and if need be burn all colonies of bees and combs that may be found not cured of foul brood or other contagious diseases.

25. Sec. 4. If the owner of a diseased apiary, honey or appliances shall knowingly or wilfully sell, barter or give away any bees, honey or appliances, or expose other bees to the danger of said disease or refuse to allow said inspector to inspect such apiary, honey or appliances, said owner shall on conviction before a justice of the peace, be liable to a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or not less than one month's imprisonment in the county jail, nor more than two month's imprisonment.

26. Sec. 5. In addition to such individual reports as are required under this act by the inspector of apiaries, he shall make an annual report to the Dairy and Food Commissioner, giving the number of the apiaries visited, the number of diseased apiaries found, the number of colonies treated, also the number of colonies destroyed by fire, and an itemized account of his transportation expenses with affidavit annexed thereto.

27. Sec. 6. There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the State Treasury not otherwise appropriated a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars per year for the suppression of foul brood among the bees in Michigan. The inspector shall receive three dollars per day and actual transportation expenses for actual time served, which sum shall not exceed the money hereby appropriated, to be paid by the State Treasurer upon warrants drawn by the Auditor General and approved by the Dairy and Food Commissioner.

28. Sec. 7. Act number one hundred forty-one of the

public acts of eighteen hundred eighty-one, being section fifty-six hundred sixty-three, fifty-six hundred sixty-four, fifty-six hundred sixty-five, fifty-six hundred sixty-six, fifty-six hundred sixty-seven, fifty-six hundred sixty-eight, fifty six hundred sixty-nine and fifty-six hundred seventy of the compiled laws of eighteen hundred ninety-seven is hereby repealed.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

GENERAL FOOD LAW.

AN ACT to prohibit and prevent adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture, and sale of articles of food and drink.

(Act No. 193, Public Acts, 1895.)

29. (C. L., 5010) Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* That no person shall within this State manufacture for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, offer or expose for sale, or sell, any article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this act.

[Am. by act No. 118, P. A. 1897.]

30. (C. L., 5011) Sec. 2. The term food, as used herein, shall include all articles used for food or drink, or intended to be eaten or drank by man, whether simple, mixed or compound.

31. (C. L., 5012) Sec. 3. An article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act: *First,* If any substance or substances have been mixed with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality strength or purity; *Second,* If any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it; *Third,* If any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it; *Fourth,* If it is an imitation of, or is sold under the name of another article; *Fifth,* If it consists wholly or in part of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected, tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not, or, in the case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal; *Sixth,* If it is colored, coated, polished or powdered whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better

or of greater value than it really is; *Seventh*, If it contains any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health: *Provided*, That nothing in this act shall prevent the coloring of pure butter: *And provided further*, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to mixtures or compounds recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, if each and every package sold or offered for sale bear the name and address of the manufacturer and be distinctly labeled under its own distinctive name, and in a manner so as to plainly and correctly show that it is a mixture or compound, and is not in violation with definition fourth and seventh of this section.

[Am. by Act No. 118, P. A. 1897.]

32. (C. L., 5013) Sec. 4. No person, by himself or his agents or servants, shall manufacture for sale or offer or expose for sale, or sell, as butter, and the legitimate product of the dairy or creamery, any article not made exclusively of milk or cream, but into which the oil or fat of animals, or any other oils not produced from milk, enters as a component part, has been introduced to take the place of cream. Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail, or the State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia for not less than ninety days nor more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court for each and every offense.

33. (C. L., 5014) Sec. 5. No person shall manufacture, deal in, sell, offer or expose for sale or exchange, any article or substance in the semblance of, or in imitation of cheese made exclusively of unadulterated milk or cream, or both, into which any animal, intestinal or offal fats or oils or melted butter in any condition or state or modification of the same, or oleaginous substances of any kind not produced from unadulterated milk or cream shall have been introduced. Whoever shall violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,

and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail or the State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia for not less than ninety days nor more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court for each and every offense.

34. (C. L., 5015) Sec. 6. Every manufacturer of full milk cheese may put a brand upon each cheese, indicating "Full milk cheese," and no person shall use such a brand upon any cheese made from milk from which any of the cream has been taken. It shall be the duty of the proprietor of every cheese factory, creamery or butter factory in the State where milk or cream is purchased of or contributed by three or more persons, to register the location of such cheese factory, creamery or butter factory and the name of its owner or manager with the Dairy and Food Commissioner on or before the first day of October, A. D. eighteen hundred ninety-seven, and on or before the first day of April in each year thereafter. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section, in so far as it relates to registration, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every offense shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than thirty days or both.

[Am. by Act No. 118, P. A. 1897.]

35. (C. L., 5016) Sec. 7. The Dairy and Food Commissioner shall procure and issue to the cheese manufacturers of the State, on proper application, which application shall be made on or before the first day of October, A. D. eighteen hundred ninety-five and on or before the first day of April in each year thereafter, and under such regulation as to the custody and use thereof as he may prescribe, a uniform stencil brand, bearing a suitable device or motto and the words "Michigan full cream cheese." Every such brand shall be used on the outside of the cheese, and upon the package containing the same, and shall bear a separate number for each separate factory. The said

commissioner shall keep a book in which shall be registered the name, location and number of each manufactory using the brand, and the name or names of persons at each factory authorized to use the same. No such brand shall be used on other than full cream cheese or packages containing the same. The commissioner shall receive a fee of one dollar for each registration, said fee to be paid by the party applying for the same, which amount shall be accounted for and used as a part of the fund appropriated for the enforcement of the laws of this State with which the Dairy and Food Commissioner is charged.

36. (C. L., 5017) Sec. 8. No person shall knowingly offer, sell or expose for sale, in any package cheese which is falsely branded or labeled.

37. (C. L., 5018) Sec. 9. No person shall within this State manufacture for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, offer or expose for sale, or sell as lard, any substance not the legitimate and exclusive product of the fat of the hog.

38. (C. L., 5019) Sec. 10. Every person who manufactures for sale, has in his possession with intent to sell, offers or exposes for sale, or sells, any substance made in the semblance of lard, or as an imitation of lard, and which consists of any mixture or compound of animal or vegetable oils, or fats, other than hog fat, in the form of lard, shall cause the tierce, barrel, tub, pail or package containing the same to be distinctly and legibly branded or labeled "Lard substitute or compound," and every person who manufactures for sale, has in his possession with intent to sell, offers or exposes for sale or sells, any substance made in the semblance of lard or as an imitation of lard, or as a substitute for lard, and which is designed to take the place of lard, and which consists of any mixture or compound of lard with animal or vegetable oils or fats, shall cause the tierce, barrel, tub, pail or package containing the same to be distinctly and legibly branded or labeled either "Adulterated lard," "Lard compound," or "Lard substitute." Such brands or labels shall be in letters not less than one inch in length and shall be followed with

the name of the maker and factory, and the location of such factory.

39. (C. L., 5020) Sec. 11. Every dealer or trader who, by himself or agent, or as the servant or agent of another person, offers or exposes for sale, or sells any form of lard substitute or adulterated lard, as hereinbefore defined, shall securely affix or cause to be affixed to the package wherein the same is contained, offered for sale or sold, a label, upon the outside and face of which is distinctly and legibly printed in letters not less than one-half inch in length, the words "Lard substitute" or "Adulterated lard" or "Lard compound" or other appropriate word which shall corectly express its nature and use.

40. (C. L., 5021) Sec. 12. The having in possession of any lard substitute or adulterated lard or lard compound, as hereinbefore defined, which is not branded or labeled as hereinbefore required and directed, upon the part of any dealer or trader, or any person engaged in the public sale of such articles, shall for the purpose of the act be deemed *prima facie* evidence of intent to sell the same.

41. (C. L., 5022) Sec. 13. No person, firm or corporation in this State shall manufacture for sale, or sell, or offer or expose for sale, as fruit jelly or fruit butter, any jelly or imitation fruit butter or other similar compound made or composed in whole or in part of glucose, dextrine, starch or other substances, and colored in imitation of fruit jelly or fruit butter; nor shall any such jelly, fruit butter or compound be manufactured or sold, or offered for sale, under any name or designation whatever, unless the same shall be composed entirely of ingredients not injurious to health, and shall not be colored in imitation of fruit jelly, and every can, pail or package of such jelly or butter sold in this State shall be distinctly and durably labeled "Imitation fruit jelly or butter," with the name of the manufacturer and the place where made. Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and when convicted thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail or State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia

for not less than ninety days nor more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of of the court.

42. (C. L., 5023) Sec. 14. No packer or dealer in preserved or canned fruits and vegetables, or other articles of food, shall sell or offer for sale such canned articles, unless such articles shall be entirely free from substances or ingredients deleterious to health, and unless such articles bear a mark, stamp, brand or label bearing the name and address of the firm, person or corporation that packs the same. All "Soaked or bleached goods," or goods put up from products dried before canning, shall be plainly marked, branded, stamped or labeled as such, with the words "Soaked or bleached goods," in letters not less than two-line pica in size, showing the name of the article and the name and address of the packer.

43. (C. L., 5024) Sec. 15. No person shall manufacture or sell, or offer for sale any manufactured or artificial coffee berry in imitation of the genuine berry. No person shall manufacture, sell or offer or expose for sale any ground or prepared coffee, which is adulterated with chicory or other substance not injurious to health, unless each package thereof shall be distinctly labeled or marked "Coffee compound," together with the name and address of the manufacturer or compounder thereof, and has no other label of whatever name or designation. No person shall offer or expore for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, or sell any molasses, syrup or glucose, unless the barrel, cask, keg, can or pail containing the same shall be distinctly branded or labeled with the true and appropriate name; nor shall any person offer or expose for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, or sell any molasses or syrup mixed with glucose, unless the barrel, cask, keg or pail containing the same be distinctly branded or labeled "Glucose mixture," and the per cent in which glucose enters into its composition. Such barrel, cask, keg or pail shall be branded or labeled in a conspicuous place; and such brands or labels shall be in letters of not less than one-half inch in length. Glucose and glucose mixtures shall have no other designation than herein required.

[Am. by Act No. 118, P. A. 1897.]

44. (C. L., 5025) Sec. 16. No person shall within this State manufacture, brew, distil, have or offer for sale, or sell, any spirituous or fermented or malt liquors, containing any substance or ingredient not normal or healthful, to exist in spirituous, fermented or malt liquors, or which may be deleterious or detrimental to health when such liquors are used as a beverage.

45. (C. L., 5026) Sec. 17. The taking of orders or the making of agreements or contracts, by any person, firm or corporation, or by any agent or representative thereof, for the future delivery of any of the articles, products, goods, wares or merchandise embraced within the provisions of this act, shall be deemed a sale within the meaning of this act.

46. (C. L., 5027) Sec. 18. Whoever shall falsely brand, mark, stencil or label any article or product required by this act to be branded, marked, stenciled, or labeled, or shall remove, alter, deface, mutilate, obliterate, imitate or counterfeit any brand, mark, stencil or label so required, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars aad the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail or State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia, for not less than six months nor more than three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court for each and every offense.

47. (C. L., 5028) Sec. 19. Whoever shall do any of the acts or things prohibited, or wilfully neglect or refuse to do any of the acts or things enjoined by this act, or in any way violate any of its provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and where no specific penalty is prescribed by this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

[Am. by Act No. 117, P. A. 1899.]

48. (C. L., 5029) Sec. 20. It shall be the duty of

the Dairy and Food Commissioner of the State to investigate all complaints of violations of this act, and take all steps necessary to its enforcement. It shall be the duty of all prosecuting officers of this State to prosecute to completion all suits brought under the provisions of this act upon the complaint of the commissioner or of any citizen. It shall be the duty of all food inspectors in cities to examine all complaints made to them of violation of this act, and to render assistance in enforcing its provisions. It shall also be the duty of all health boards in cities and health officers in townships to take cognizance of and report or prosecute all violations of this act that may be brought to their notice, or they may have cognizance of, within their jurisdiction.

49. Sec. 21. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed.

BUCKWHEAT FLOUR.

AN ACT in relation to the manufacture and sale of buckwheat flour.

(Act No. 208, Public Acts, 1903.)

50. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* Within this State no person shall manufacture, offer or expose for sale, keep in possession with intent to sell, or sell any ground buckwheat containing any product of wheat, corn, rice or other foreign substance, unless each and every package thereof be distinctly and legibly branded or labeled "Buckwheat Flour Compound" in letters not less than one-half inch in length and be followed with the name of the maker and factory and the location of such factory.

51. Sec. 2. Any brand or label herein required shall be an inseparable part of the general or distinguishing label, and such label shall be that principal and conspicuous sign under which it is sold, and any other label or printed mat-

ter upon the package shall not be in contravention of the requirements of this act.

52. Sec. 3. The having in possession of any buckwheat flour compound, which is not branded or labeled as hereinbefore required and directed upon the part of any person engaged in the public or private sale of such article, shall, for the purpose of this act, be deemed *prima facie* evidence of intent to sell the same.

53. Sec. 4. The taking of orders or the making of agreements or contract by any person, firm or corporation or by any agent or representative thereof, for the future delivery of buckwheat flour compound shall be deemed a sale within the meaning of this act.

54. Sec. 5. Whoever shall do any of the acts or things prohibited, or neglect or refuse to do any of the acts or things enjoined by this act, or in any way violate any of the provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than thirty nor more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

55. Sec. 6. Act number eighty-four of the public acts of eighteen hundred ninety-seven, entitled "An act to prohibit and prevent adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture and sale of buckwheat flour," being sections four thousand nine hundred ninety-four to five thousand two, both inclusive, of the Compiled Laws of one thousand eight hundred ninety-seven is hereby repealed.

VINEGAR.

AN ACT in relation to the manufacture and sale of vinegar, and to repeal act number two hundred and twenty-four of the public acts of eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, approved July one, eighteen hundred and eighty- nine.

(Act No. 71, Public Acts, 1897.)

56. (C. L., 5003) Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* That no person shall manufacture for sale, offer or expose for sale, sell or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell, or deliver, any vinegar not in compliance with the provisions of this act. No vinegar shall be sold as apple, orchard or cidar vinegar, which is not the legitimate product of pure apple juice, known as apple cider or vinegar, not made exclusively of said apple cider or vinegar into which foreign substance, drugs or acids have been introduced, as may appear upon proper test, and upon said test, shall contain not less than one and three-fourths per cent, by weight, of cider vinegar solids upon full evaporation at the temperature of boiling water.

57. (C. L., 5004) Sec. 2. All vinegar made by fermentation and oxidation without the intervention of distillation shall be branded "fermented vinegar," with the name of the fruit or substance from which the same is made. And all vinegar made wholly or in part from distilled liquor shall be branded "distilled vinegar," and all of such distilled vinegar shall be free from coloring matter added during or after distillation and from color other than that imparted to it by distillation. And all fermented vinegar not distilled shall contain not less than one and three-fourths per cent, by weight, upon full evaporation (at the temperature of boiling water) of solids, contained in the fruit or grain from which said vinegar is fermented, and said vinegar shall contain not less than two and a half tenths of one per cent ash or mineral matter, the same being the product of the material from which said vinegar is manu-

factured. And all vinegar shall be made wholly from the fruit or grain from which it purports to be or is represented to be made, and shall contain no foreign substance, and shall contain not less than four per cent, by weight, of absolute acetic acid.

58. (C. L., 5005) Sec. 3. No person shall manufacture for sale, offer for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any vinegar found upon proper test to contain any preparation of lead, copper, sulphuric or other mineral acid, or other ingredients injurious to health. And all packages containing vinegar shall be marked, stenciled or branded on the head of the cask, barrel or keg containing such vinegar with the name and residence of the manufacturer together with brand required in section two hereof.

59. (C. L., 5006) Sec. 4. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed ninety days and the costs of prosecution, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

60. Sec. 5. All acts and parts of acts contravening the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

MILK.

AN ACT to prevent and punish offenders for the adulteration of milk, and the products made therefrom, and to repeal an act entitled "An act to prevent the adulteration of milk and to prevent the traffic in impure and unwholesome milk," approved March thirty-first, eighteen hundred and seventy-one.

(Act No. 26, Public Acts, 1873.)

61. (C. L., 11411) Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* That whoever shall knowingly sell to any person or persons, or sell, deliver, or bring to be manufactured to any cheese or butter manufactory in this State, any milk diluted with water, or in any way adulterated,

or milk from which any cream has been taken, or milk commonly known as "skimmed milk," or shall keep back any part of the milk known as "strippings," with intent to defraud, or shall knowingly sell milk, the product of a sick or diseased animal or animals, or any milk produced from any cow fed upon the refuse of a distillery, or of a brewery, or upon any substance deleterious to the quality of the milk, or shall knowingly use any poisonous or any deleterious material in the manufacture of any cheese or butter, or shall knowingly sell or offer to sell any cheese or butter, in the manufacture of which any poisonous or deleterious substance has been used, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars; and may be committed to the county jail until such fine shall be paid: *Provided,* That such imprisonment shall not exceed ninety days; and shall be liable in double the amount of damages to the person or persons, firm, association, or corporation upon which such fraud shall have been committed. An act entitled "An act to prevent the adulteration of milk and to prevent the traffic in impure and unwholesome milk," approved March thirty-first, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, is hereby repealed: *Provided,* That any right accrued or forfeiture incurred under said act, shall remain valid and binding, and may be enforced under said act as if the same were not repealed.

AN ACT to prevent the sale of impure, unwholesome, adulterated, or swill milk in the State of Michigan, and to provide for inspectors.

(Act No. 246, Public Acts, 1887.)

62. (C. L., 11412) Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* That it shall be unlawful for any person, either by himself or agent, to sell or expose for sale within the State of Michigan any unwholesome, watered, or adulterated or impure milk or swill milk or colostrum, or milk from cows kept upon garbage, swill or any sub-

stance in a state of fermentation or putrefaction or other deleterious substances, or from cows kept in connection with any family in which there are infectious diseases. The addition of water or ice to the milk is hereby declared an adulteration.

[Am. by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

63. (C. L., 11413) Sec. 2. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the preceding section shall be punished by a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars or (by) imprisonment not to exceed three months or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

64. (C. L., 11414) Sec. 3. It shall be the duty of the metropolitan police commissioners of the city of Detroit, by and with the consent and advice of the board of health of the city of Detroit, to appoint an inspector, who shall be a person of previous practical experience. Said inspector may be created captain, sergeant or roundsman of the said police force of the city of Detroit, at the option of the board of metropolitan police commissioners.

65. (C. L., 11415) Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of said inspector to personally view, so far as possible, all milk exposed for sale in said city, and to visit all dairy houses, barns, or stables in said city or the county of Wayne, to inspect the same, and the animals held therein, and to visit all places where milk is kept or exposed for sale in the city of Detroit, and to inspect and ascertain the condition of said milk. He may detail any patrolman of said city to assist him in the performance of any or all of the duties enjoined on him by this act: *Provided, always,* That said inspector and any policeman so detailed shall alway be subject to the provisions of the law establishing and governing the metropolitan police of said city.

66. (C. L., 11416) Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of said inspector or of his assistant, and of all other inspectors appointed under this act, to make complaint in writing before a police justice or justice of the peace, or other court having jurisdiction thereof, of every violation of this act coming to his knowledge.

[Am. by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

67. (C. L., 11417) Sec. 6. Each and every quantity of milk sold or exposed for sale contrary to the provisions of this act, shall constitute a separate offense.

68. (C. L., 11418) Sec. 7. Any person who shall refuse to permit the said inspector, or his assistant (assistants,) to perform his duty under this act, either by refusing him entrance to his premises or by concealing any milk, or refusing to permit any milk or animal or premises wherein animals are kept, to be viewed and inspected as herein provided, or by in any manner hindering or resisting any said inspector or assistant inspector in the performance of his duty, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished therefor.

69. (C. L., 11419) Sec. 8. Authority is hereby given the common council of any city, and the board of trustees or council of any village, to appoint an inspector of milk in any such city or village, and to fix their compensation, and when appointed the said inspectors of milk shall have all the powers given by section four of this act, and shall perform all the duties required of inspectors of milk as provided herein, and such other powers and duties as may be conferred or imposed by the ordinances of said cities or villages.

70. (C. L., 11420) Sec. 9. Whoever shall adulterate by himself, or by his servant or agent, or sell, exchange or deliver, or have in his custody or possession with intent to sell or exchange the same, or exposes or offers for sale or exchange, adulterated milk or milk to which water or any foreign (substance) substances in any state of fermentation or putrefaction, or from sick or diseased cows, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, for every such offense, be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail or the State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia not exceeding three months.

[Added by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

71. (C. L., 11421) Sec. 10. Whoever shall adulterate, himself, or by his servant or agent, sell, exchange or deliver, or have in his custody or possession with intent

to sell or exchange the same, or exposes or offers for sale as pure milk, any skimmed milk from which the cream or any part thereof has been removed shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, for such offense, be punished by the penalty provided in the preceding section.

[Added by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

72. (C. L., 11422) Sec. 11. Any dealer in milk who shall by himself, servant or agent, sell, exchange or deliver, or have in his custody or possession with intent to sell, exchange or deliver the same, milk from which the cream or any part thereof has been removed, unless in a conspicuous place above the center upon the outside of every vessel, can or package from which any such milk is sold, the words "Skimmed milk" are distinctly painted in letters not less than one inch in length, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail or Detroit House of Correction not exceeding three months.

[Added by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

73. (C. L., 11423) Sec. 12. If milk sold or offered for sale under the provisions of this act as pure milk, is shown upon analysis by weight to contain more than eighty-seven and fifty one hundredths per centum of watery fluid, or to contain less than twelve and fifty one hundredths of milk solids, per centum, or less fat than three per centum, or if the specific gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit is not between 1 29-1000 to 1 33-1000, it shall be deemed to be adulterated. If milk sold or offered for sale under the provisions of this act as skimmed milk has a specific gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit less than 1,032, and greater than 1,037, it shall be deemed to be adulterated.

[Added by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

74. (C. L., 11424) Sec. 13. Whenever any inspector of milk has reason to believe that any milk found by him is adulterated, he shall take specimens thereof and test the same with such instrument or instruments as are used

for such purposes, and he shall make an analysis thereof, showing total solids, the percentage of butter, the percentage of water and the percentage of ash; and if the result of such test and analysis indicates that the milk has been adulterated or deprived of its cream or any part thereof, the same shall be *prima facie* evidence of such adulteration in a prosecution under this act.

[Added by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

75. (C. L., 11425) Sec. 14. Any person who shall remove the cream or any part thereof from milk to be sold as pure milk to any manufactory in which milk is used as a material in the process of production, and any person who shall, in any manner, adulterate such milk, either by the addition of water or otherwise, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, for every such offense, be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail or Detroit House of Correction not exceeding ninety days.

[Added by Act No. 219, P. A. 1889.]

AN ACT in relation to the sale and delivery of milk.

(Act No. 106, Public Acts, 1899.)

76. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* No person shall offer or expose for sale, sell, exchange or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell, exchange or deliver, any milk to which water, chemicals or preservatives, or any other foreign substance has been added. The term milk as used in this act shall include all skimmed milk, butter milk, cream and milk in its natural state as drawn from the cow.

77. Sec. 2. Whoever shall do any of the act or things prohibited, or neglects or refuses to do any of the acts or things enjoined by this act, or in any way violates any of its provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one dollar

nor more than one hundred dollars and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

OLEOMARGARINE.

AN ACT in relation to the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine or imitation butter.

(Act No. 147, Public Acts, 1899.)

78. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* No person shall sell, expose or offer for sale or exchange, or have in his possession with intent to sell or exchange, any oleomargarine or other substance made in imitation of butter, and which is intended to be used as a substitute for butter, unless each and every vessel, package, roll or parcel of such substance has distinctly and durably printed, stamped or stenciled thereon in black letters the true name of such substance, in ordinary bold faced capital letters, not less than five line pica in size; and also the name and address of the manufacturer, together with the name of each and every article or ingredient used or entering into the composition of such substance, in ordinary bold faced letters, not less than pica in size.

79. Sec. 2. No person shall sell exchange or deliver any oleomargarine or other substance made in imitation of butter, and which is intended to be used as a substitute for butter, unless he shall distinctly inform the purchaser by a verbal notice at the time of the sale that the same is a substitute for butter, and shall also deliver to the purchaser of each and every roll, package or parcel of such oleomargarine or other substance, at the time of the delivery of the same, a separate and distinct label, on which is plainly and legibly printed in black ink in ordinary bold faced capital letters not less than five line pica in size, the

true name of such substance and also the name and address of the manufacturer, together with the name of each article used and entering into the composition of such substance, in ordinary bold faced letters not less than pica in size.

80. Sec. 3. The proprietor or keeper of any store, hotel, restaurant, eating saloon, boarding house, or other place where oleomargarine is sold or furnished to persons paying for the same, shall have placed on the walls of every store or room where oleomargarine is sold or furnished, a white placard on which is printed in black ink, in plain Roman letters of not less than three inches in length, and not less than two inches in width, the words "Oleomargarine Sold or Used Here," and shall at all times keep the same exposed in such conspicuous place as to be readily seen by any and all persons entering such store, or other room or rooms.

81. Sec. 4. No person shall use in any way, in connection or association with the sale or exposure for sale or advertisement of any substance designed to be used as a substitute for butter, the word "butter," "creamery," or "dairy," or the name or representation of any breed of dairy cattle, or any combination of such word or words and representation, or any other words or symbols or combinations thereof commonly used in the sale of butter.

82. Sec. 5. For the purpose of this act the word "butter" shall be understood to mean the food product usually known as butter, and which is made exclusively from milk or cream, or both, with or without common salt, and with or without additional coloring matter.

83. Sec. 6. For the purposes of this act certain manufactured substances, certain extracts, and certain mixtures and compounds, including such mixtures and compounds with butter, shall be known and designated as "oleomargarine," namely: All substances heretofore known as oleomargarine, oleo, oleomargarine oil, butterine, lardine, suine and neutral; all mixtures and compounds of oleomargarine, oleo, oleomargarine oil, butterine, lardine, suine and neutral; all lard extracts and tallow extracts; and all mixtures and compounds of tallow, beef fat, suet,

lard, lard oil, vegetable oil, butterine, lardine, suine and neutral; all lard extracts and tallow extracts; and all mixtures and compounds of tallow, beef fat, suet, lard, lard oil, vegetable oil, intestinal fat, and offal fat, made in imitation or semblance of butter, or when so made, calculated or intended to be sold or used as butter or for butter.

84. Sec. 7. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail or State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia, for not less than six months nor more than three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, in each and every offense. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

AN ACT to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter.

(Act No. 22, Public Acts, 1901.)

85. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* No person, by himself or his agents, or servants, shall render or manufacture, sell, offer for sale, expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any article, product or compound made wholly or in part out of any fat, oil or oleaginous substance or compound thereof, not produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, which shall be in imitation of yellow butter produced from pure unadulterated milk or cream of the same: *Provided,* That nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form, and in such manner as will advise the consumer of its real character, free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to look like butter.

86. Sec. 2. Whoever violates any of the provisions of section one of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail or State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia for not less than six months nor more than three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, for each and every offense.

RENOVATED BUTTER.

AN ACT in relation to the manufacture and sale of renovated butter.

(Act No. 243, Public Acts, 1903.)

87. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* No person, firm or corporation shall manufacture for sale, offer or expose for sale, sell, exchange or deliver, or have in his possession with the intent to sell, exchange or deliver, any butter that is produced by taking original packing stock butter or other butter, or both, melting the same so that the butter fat can be drawn off or extracted, mixing the said butter fat with skimmed milk, or milk or cream, or other milk product, and rechurning or reworking the said mixture; nor shall any person, firm or corporation manufacture for sale, offer or expose for sale, sell, exchange or deliver, or have in his possession for any such purpose any butter which has been subjected to any process by which it is melted, clarified or refined, and made to resemble butter, and is commonly known as boiled, process or renovated butter, and which for the purpose of this act is hereby designated as "Renovated Butter," unless the same shall be branded or marked as provided in section two of this act.

88. Sec. 2. Whoever, himself or by his agent, or as the servant or agent of another person shall sell, expose

for sale or have in his custody or possession with the intent to sell any "Renovated Butter," as defined in section one of this act, shall have the words "Renovated Butter" conspicuously stamped, labeled or marked in one or two lines and in plain gothic letters, at least three-eighths of an inch square, so that the words cannot be easily defaced, upon two sides of each and every tub, firkin, box or package containing said "Renovated Butter;" or, if such butter is exposed for sale uncovered, or not in a case or package, a placard containing said words in the same form as above described in this section shall be attached to the mass in such a manner as to be easily seen and read by the purchaser. When "Renovated Butter" is sold from such package or otherwise at retail, in print, roll or other form, before being delivered to the purchaser, it shall be wrapped in wrappers plainly stamped on the outside thereof with the words "Renovated Butter" printed or stamped thereon in one or two lines, and in plain gothic letters at least three-eighths of an inch square, and such wrapper shall contain no other words or printing thereon, and said words "Renovated Butter" so stamped or printed on the said wrapper shall not be in any manner concealed, but shall be in plain view of the purchaser at the time of the purchase.

89. Sec. 3. Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail or Michigan Reformatory at Ionia, for not less than six months nor more than three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each and every offense.

90. Sec. 4. Act number two hundred fifty-four of the public acts of eighteen hundred ninety-nine, entitled "An act to regulate the sale of butter produced by taking original packing stock and other butter and melting the same so that the butter oil can be drawn off, mixed with skimmed milk or other material, and by emulsion or other process produce butter, and butter produced by any similar process and commonly known as "process" butter;

providing for the enforcement thereof, and punishment for the violation of the same,'' is hereby repealed.

CANDY.

AN ACT to prevent the adulteration of candies and confectioneries and the sale thereof, when so adulturated as to be injurious to the public health.

(Act No. 11, Public Acts, 1887.)

91. (C. L., 11409) Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* That any person or persons manufacturing for sale or knowingly selling or offering to sell any candies or confectioneries adulterated by the admixture of terra alba, barytes, talc or other earthy or mineral substances, or any poisonous colors, flavors or extracts, or other deleterious ingredients detrimental to health, shall upon proper conviction thereof, before a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten nor more than thirty days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

92. (C. L., 11410) Sec. 2. It is hereby made the duty of the local health officer or local board of health having jurisdiction thereof to investigate without unnecessary delay all complaints that may be properly brought before them and containing the facts as supported by affidavit of the parties complaining of the adulteration or sale of adulterated candies or confectioneries, and if after investigation by such officer or board reasonable cause for action is found to exist, then such officer or board shall at once give notice to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such complaint is made, and make or cause to be made, before a proper officer, a formal complaint in writing and duly verified, and thereupon said prosecuting attorney shall immediately commence proceedings against the person or persons so offending.

LIQUORS.

AN ACT for the regulation of, manufacture and sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors.

(Extract from Act No. 313, Public Acts, 1887.)

93. (C. L., 5403) Sec. 25. If any person shall adulterate any spirituous, or alcoholic liquors used or intended for drink, by mixing the same in the manufacture or preparation thereof, or by process of rectifying, or otherwise, with any deleterious drug, substance, or liquid, which is poisonous or injurious to health, except as hereinafter provided, or if any person shall sell, or offer to sell, any wine, or spirituous, or alcoholic liquors, or shall import into this State, any wine, or spirituous, or intoxicating liquors and sell, or offer for sale such liquors, knowing the same to be adulterated, or shall sell, or offer to sell, any spirituous or intoxicating liquors from any barrel, cask, or other vessel containing the same, and not branded as hereinafter provided, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, nor less than fifty dollars, and shall be imprisoned in the jail of the county not more than six months, nor less than ten days.

94. (C. L., 5404) Sec. 26. It shall be the duty of every person or persons, engaged in the manufacture and sale of malt, spirituous, or alcoholic liquors, or in rectifying or preparing the same in any way, to brand on each barrel, cask, or other vessel containing the same, the name or names of the person, company, or firm manufacturing, rectifying or preparing the same, and also these words, "Pure and without drugs or poison."

95. (C. L., 5405) Sec. 27. No person shall sell at wholesale or retail, any ale, rum, wine or other malt or spirituous liquors from any barrel, cask, or vessel, unless the same shall have been branded and marked as aforesaid.

96. (C. L., 5406) Sec. 28. If any barrel, cask or other

vessel containing any drugged or poisoned liquor shall be found in the possession of any wholesale or retail dealer in liquors, or in the possession of any person holding himself out as such a dealer, it shall be deemed *prima facie* evidence of the violation of the provisions of this act.

97. (C. L., 5407) Sec. 29. Any person who shall put into any barrel, cask, or other vessel, branded or marked as required by this act, any liquors drugged or adulterated as aforesaid, or who shall sell or offer for sale any such liquors, for the purpose and with the intent of deceiving any person in the sale thereof, or shall violate any of the provisions of sections twenty-six, twenty-seven, or twenty-eight, of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as provided in section twenty-five of this act.

98. (C. L., 5408) Sec. 30. The provisions of this act shall not be so construed as to prevent druggists, physicians, and persons engaged in the mechanical arts from compounding liquors for medicinal and mechanical purposes.

PEPPER.

AN ACT to provide for the manufacture and sale of black pepper in this State and to provide a penalty for the violation of the provisions of this act.

(Act No. 180, Public Acts, 1901.)

99. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* Within this State no person, firm or corporation shall manufacture, offer or expose for sale, keep in possession with intent to sell, or sell any ground or whole black pepper containing any foreign substance whatever. All black pepper shall contain not more than six and one-half per cent ash or mineral matter; and shall contain not less than twenty-five per cent starch as determined by the diastase method; and shall contain not less than six-tenths

of one per cent nor more than one and three-fourths per cent of volatile ether extract; and shall contain not more than ten per cent nor less than six and one-half per cent of non-volatile ether extract; and shall contain not more than sixteen per cent of crude fibre.

100. Sec. 2. Whoever shall do any of the acts or things prohibited, or neglects or refuses to do any of the acts or things enjoined by this act, or in any way violates any of its provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than five hundred dollars and the costs of the prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

CORN SYRUP.

AN ACT in relation to the sale of corn syrup.

(Act No. 123, Public Acts, 1903.)

101. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* No person shall offer or expose for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, or sell, any cane syrup, beet syrup, or glucose, unless the barrel, cask, keg, can, pail or package containing the same be distinctly branded or labeled with the true and appropriate name; nor shall any person offer or expose for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, or sell any cane syrup or beet syrup mixed with glucose unless the barrel, cask, keg, can, pail or package containing the same be distinctly branded or labeled "Glucose Mixture" or "Corn Syrup" in plain gothic type not less than three-eighths of an inch square, with the name and percentage by weight of each ingredient contained therein plainly stamped, branded or stenciled on each package in plain Gothic letters not less than one-quarter of an inch square. Each and every package of syrup either simple or mixed shall bear the name and address of the

manufacturer. Such mixtures or syrups shall have no other designation or brand than herein required that represents or is the name of any article which contains a saccharine substance; and all brands or labels required shall be an inseparable part of the general or distinguishing label, and that the general or distinguishing label shall be that principal and conspicuous sign under which it is sold.

102. Sec. 2. Whoever shall do any of the acts or things prohibited, or neglect or refuse to do any of the acts or things required by this act, or in any way violate any of the provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than thirty nor more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

PRESERVATIVES.

AN ACT in relation to the use of preservatives in food products.

(Act No. 13, Public Acts, 1905.)

103. Section 1. *The People of the State of Michigan enact,* No person, firm or corporation shall manufacture, sell, offer for sale, expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any food product containing benzoic acid or benzoate of sodium, or any other harmless preservative, unless each and every package containing the same shall, in the condition in which it is exposed for sale, be distinctly, conspicuously, and legibly branded, labeled or marked, in plain English letters, with the words "Prepared with" followed by the proper English name of the preservative used: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit or regulate, by branding or otherwise, the use as a preservative of common salt, syrup, sugar, salt petre, spices, alcohol, vinegar or wood smoke: And

Provided Further, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to dairy products.

104. Sec. 2. Whoever shall do any of the acts or things prohibited, or neglect or refuse to do any of the acts or things required by this act, or in any way violate any of its provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

DECISIONS RELATIVE TO DAIRY AND FOOD LAWS

PEOPLE v. SNOWBERGER.

(Opinion filed May 25, 1897.)

Adulteration of Food—Statutory Offenses—Intent—Police Power.

1. It is competent for the legislature under the police power, to provide for the protection of the public health by making it an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment to sell adulterated food or drink, irrespective of the seller's knowledge of the adulteration.
2. Act No. 193, Public Acts 1895, prohibits the manufacture or sale of adulterated articles of food or drink, and prescibes what shall be deemed adulteration within the meaning of the act. Section 8 forbids any person from *knowingly* offering for sale cheese which is falsely labeled; this being the only case in which knowledge is expressly made an element of an offense designated by such statute. *Held*, that proof of guilty knowledge or intent is not essential to the conviction of one who sells adulterated food.

(113 Mich. 86.)

Exceptions before judgment from Monroe; Kinne, J.

Michael Snowberger was convicted of selling adulterated food, in violation of act No. 193, Public Acts of 1895.

Conviction affirmed.

William Look and Ira G. Humphrey, for appellant.

Bowen, Douglas & Whiting, of counsel.

Willis Baldwin, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Long, C. J.: Respondent was convicted under an information charging that: "On the 19th day of April, A. D. 1897, at the city of Monroe, and in the county aforesaid, Michael Snowberger did offer for sale, and sell, to Carl Franke, an adulterated article of food, to wit: A quantity of mustard, to wit, a quarter of a pound, colored and adulterated with turmeric, whereby the said mustard, as an article of food, was damaged and its inferiority concealed and whereby it was made to appear of better and of greater value than it really was, the same not being a mixture or compound recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided," etc.

The information was filed under act No. 193, Public Acts 1895, entitled "An act to prohibit and prevent adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture and sale of articles of food and drink." The act provides:

Section 1. "No person shall within this State manufacture for sale, offer for sale, or sell any article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this act."

Section 2. "The term food as used herein, shall include all articles used for food or drink, or intended to be eaten or drunk by man, whether simple, mixed or compound."

Section 3. "An article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act: One, If any substance or substances have been mixed with it so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity; Two, If any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it; Three, If any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it; Four, If it is sold under the name of another article; Five, If it consists wholly or in part of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected, tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not, or in case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal; Six, If it is colored, coated, polished or powdered, whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is; Seven, It it contains an added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health: *Provided,* That the provisions of this act shall not apply to mixtures or compounds recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, if each and every package sold or offered for sale be distinctly labeled as mixtures or compounds, and are not injurious to health."

Section 19 makes any violation of the act a misdemeanor and provides a penalty by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500, or by imprisonment in the county jail, etc.

On the trial respondent admitted, that on the 19th day of April, 1897, he, at the city of Monroe, this State, offered for sale and did sell to Carl Franke a quantity of mustard, to wit, a quarter of a pound which was afterwards found upon a chemical examination to be colored and adulterated with turmeric, whereby the said mustard as an article of food was damaged and its inferiority concealed, and it was thereby made to appear of greater and better value than it really was; the same not being a mixture or compound recognized as an ordinary article or ingredient of articles of food.

But he claimed that said article of mustard, so sold was purchased by him as a pure article in good faith, and that he believed at the time of the purchase by him and also at the time of the sale to the said Franke, that the same was pure mustard, free from any coloring and adulteration with turmeric or any other coloring or adulterant, and that no inferiority was concealed whereby it was made to appear of greater or better value than it really was; that at the time he purchased the same he asked for pure mustard and that the same was warranted to him as pure; that he did not make or cause to have made a chemical examination of the same and did not inform himself or endeavor to ascertain the methods of determining pure from impure mustards, but relied upon the representations of his vender and the appearance of the article to the eye; and that he did not intend to violate the law.

From such conviction respondent appeals.

It is the contention of counsel for respondent that it was the intent of the legislature to provide by the act that no person should be convicted and punished for selling adulterated food or drink without showing that he knew the same to be adulterated; that the information does not charge such knowledge, and the proofs disclose that respondent acted in good faith and in the belief that the article sold was pure and unadulterated.

The act cannot be so construed. The offense under the act consists in selling an article intended to be eaten or drunk which is adulterated. Section 8 of the act shows conclusively that the legislature did not intend to make criminal intent or guilty knowledge a necessary ingredient of the offense. As a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but this rule is not universal.

In People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, (50 Am. Rep. 270), the respondent was convicted of the offense under the statute of keeping his saloon open on Sunday. It was there said; "It is contended that to con-

stitute an offense under the section referred to (How. Stat., Sec. 2274), there must be some evidence tending to show an intent on the part of the respondent to violate it. * * * The section under which Roby is prosecuted makes the crime consist, not in the affirmative act of any person, but in the negative conduct of failing to keep the saloon closed. As a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but this is not by any means a universal rule. One may be guilty of the high crime of manslaughter when his only fault is gross negligence, and there are many other cases where mere neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible."

Many cases are cited in that case where convictions were sustained although the element of guilty knowledge was lacking. Thus in Massachusetts a person may be convicted of the crime of selling intoxicating liquors as a beverage though he did not know it to be intoxicating.

Com. v. Boynton, 2 Allen, 160.

And of the offense of selling adulterated milk, though ignorant of its adulteration.

Com. v. Farren, 9 Allen, 489.
Com. v. Nichols, 10 Allen 199.
Com. v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264.
Com. v. Smith, 103 Mass., 444.

In Missouri a magistrate may be liable to the penalty for performing the marriage ceremony for minors without consent of parents or guardians, though he may suppose them to be of the proper age.

Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo., 546.

Where the killing and sale of a calf under a specified age is prohibited there may be a conviction though the party was ignorant of the animal's age.

Com. v. Raymond, 97 Mass., 567.

In People v. Welsh, 71 Mich. 548, this court in speaking of People v. Roby, supra, said: "When a statute does not make intent an element of the offense, but commands an act to be done or omitted which in the absence of the statute might have been done or omitted without culpability, ignorance of the fact or state of things contemplated by the statute will not excuse its violation;" citing:

State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis., 60.

In the late case in this court of Walcott v. Judge of Superior court, 112 Mich. 311, the relator, as prosecuting attorney of the county, filed an information against one Fred Saunders, charging him with being engaged in selling liquor without giving the bond required by the statute. The bond was fair upon its face, but one of the sureties, it appears, was disqualified under section 2283dl, 3 How. Stat. The information did not allege that respondent had knowledge of this defect in the bond. The information was quashed by the court below, and the relator asked the aid of mandamus to compel the respondent to reinstate the case. It was said by this court in the majority opinion: "It was the intention of the legislature to make the execution and delivery of the prescribed bond a condition precedent to sale, and to require the person desiring to engage in the business mentioned to assume the responsibility of knowing that the bond when presented complies in all essential particulars with the law. He must know that his sureties are males, that they are resident freeholders of the township, village or city in which the business is to be carried on, that they hold none of the offices prohibited by the act, and that at the time the bond is filed neither is a surety upon more than two bonds required by the act."

It appeared that one of the sureties was already upon more than two bonds; and the writ was granted compelling the respondent to reinstate the case. The case of People v. Roby was cited in that case in support of the proposition that intent was not an ingredient of the offense.

These regulations are under the police power of the State. Undoubtedly it was competent for the legislature to prohibit the sale of adulterated articles of food and drink. The police power of the State extends to the protection of the health as well as of the lives and property of the citizens. Generally it is for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health and secure the public comfort and safety. If it passes an

act ostensibly for the public health and thereby destroys or takes away the property of the citizen or interferes with his liberty it is for the courts to determine whether it relates to and is appropriate to promote such public health. Under the police power the conduct of individuals and the use of property may be regulated so as to interfere to some extent with the freedom of the one and the enjoyment of the other. It cannot be doubted that the legislature intended by this act to protect the public against the harmful consequences of sales of adulterated food, and to the end that its purpose might not be defeated to require the seller at his peril to know that the article which he offers for sale is not adulterated.

As was said by the supreme court of Ohio, in State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166: "If this statute had imposed upon the State the burden of proving * * * his knowledge of its adulteration, it would thereby have defeated its declared purpose."

In State v. Smith, 10 R. I. 260, the court, in speaking of the offense of selling adulterated milk, said: "Counsel for defendant asked the court to charge that there must be evidence of a guilty intent on the part of the defendant and of a guilty knowledge in order to convict him. Our statute in that provision of it, under which this indictment was found does not essentially differ from the statute of Massachusetts, and there previous to the enactment of our statute the supreme court had determined that a person might be convicted although he had no knowledge of the adulteration; the intent of the legislature being that the seller of milk should take upon himself the risk of knowing that the article he offers for sale is not adulterated."

Statutes in many states have been passed providing that whoever sells, or keeps or offers for sale adulterated milk, or milk to which water or other foreign substance has been added shall be punished, etc. Under these statutes it has been decided many times that the risk is upon the seller of knowing that the article he offers for sale is not adulterated, and that it is not necessary in an indictment under such a statute to allege or prove criminal intent or guilty knowledge.

Com. v. Smith, 103 Mass., 444.
Com. v. Warren, 160 Mass., 533.
People v. Clipperly, 101 N. Y., 634.

The same rule that no criminal intent is necessary has been held to apply under an act forbidding the sale of oleomargarine or other

imitations of dairy products, unless express notice be given to the purchaser.

Bayles v. Newton, 50 N. J., L. 549.
Com. v. Gray, 150 Mass., 327.

The English rule is in keeping with the doctrine in this country on this subject.

Roberts v. Egerton, L. R., 9 Q. B., 494.

The statute not requiring knowledge on the part of the seller to make the offense complete, we are satisfied that the conviction must be sustained. No case has been cited, and we are not able to find one, where a contrary doctrine is laid down. The act may work hardship in many cases; but that question is one to be addressed to the legislature and not to the courts. As we have said, it was within the power of the legislature to pass the act making it an offense punishable with fine and imprisonment to sell adulterated food or drink, although the person selling the same has no knowledge that it is adulterated. Under this statute one making sales must do so at his peril.

The conviction is affirmed.

Grant, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. WORDEN GROCER CO.

(Opinion filed December 6, 1898.)

Constitutional Law—Act to Prevent Sale of Adulterated Vinegar—Complaint—Reasonableness of Statute—Defense.

1. The title to an act reading "An act in relation to the manufacture and sale of vinegar, and to repeal Act No. 224 of the Public Acts of 1889, approved, etc.," held broad enough to support an enactment to prevent deception in the sale of vinegar or to prevent adulteration of vinegar.
2. A conviction for a sale of "fermented cider vinegar" which was not up to the standard prescribed by Act No. 71, Public Acts of 1897, may be had under a complaint drawn under section 2 of the act.

3. The question as to whether the requirements of an act passed to prevent the sale of adulterated vinegar are such as to render the act unreasonable, cannot be determined by the courts and does not raise a question of fact for determination by a jury.
4. Where a sample of vinegar is taken from a dealer for the purpose of testing it to see if it conforms to the standard required by law it is not necessary that a sample be left with the dealer.
5. A prosecution for a sale of vinegar in violation of Act No. 71, Public Acts of 1897, cannot be defended on the ground that the person so manufacturing or selling vinegar below the standard has no knowledge that it is not within the standard prescribed.

Error to the circuit court of Kent county; Allen C. Adsit, J.

Appeal of the Worden Grocer Co. from a conviction of a violation of act No. 71, Public Acts of 1897. Affirmed.

Frank A. Rodgers, Prosecuting Attorney; Benn M. Corwin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Rood & Hindman, for respondent.

Long, J.: The complaint in this cause charges that the defendant: "On February 5, 1898, did unlawfully sell and deliver to John T. Owens of Benton Harbor, Michigan, a large quantity, to wit: One barrel of vinegar which was not then and there in compliance with the provisions of act No. 71, Public Acts, 1897, in this, viz.: That said vinegar was sold as "fermented cider vinegar" and branded as such; that said vinegar contained less than one and three-fourths per cent by weight upon full evaporation (at the temperature of boiling water) of solids contained in the fruit from which said vinegar is fermented, to wit: One and fifty-one one-hundredths per cent of solids; and said vinegar contained less than two and a half tenths of one per cent ash or mineral matter, the same being the product of the material from which said vinegar was manufactured, to wit: Eight one hundredths of one per cent of ash or mineral matter, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided," etc.

The cause was commenced in the police court, and, being removed to the circuit, came on to be heard before a jury. The defendant refused to plead, and counsel for defendant thereupon made a motion to quash the complaint and summons for several reasons which will hereafter be discussed. The court upon the trial directed a verdict of guilty, and the cause comes to this court on exceptions before judgment.

The title of the act reads: "An act in relation to the manufacture and sale of vinegar, and to repeal act No. 224 of the Public Acts of 1889, approved," etc. Sections one and two of the act, being the sections in question, provide:

"Section 1. The People of the State of Michigan enact, That no person shall manufacture for sale, offer or expose for sale, sell or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell or deliver, any vinegar not in compliance with the provisions of this act. No vinegar shall be sold as apple, orchard or cider vinegar, which is not the legitimate product of pure apple juice, known as apple cider or vinegar not made exclusively of said apple cider or vinegar into which foreign substance, drugs or acids have been introduced, as may appear upon proper test, and upon said test, shall contain not less than one and three-fourths per cent, by weight, of cider vinegar solids upon full evaporation at the temperature of boiling water.

"Section 2. All vinegar made by fermentation and oxidation without the intervention of distillation shall be branded 'fermented vinegar' with the name of the fruit or substance from which the same is made, And all vinegar made wholly or in part from distilled liquor shall be branded 'distilled vinegar,' and all of such distilled vinegar shall be free from coloring matter added during or after distillation and from color other from that imparted to it by distillation. And all fermented vinegar not distilled shall contain not less than one and three-fourths per cent, by weight, upon full evaporation (at the temperature of boiling water) of solids, contained in the fruit or grain from which said vinegar is fermented, and said vinegar shall contain not less than two and a half tenths of one per cent ash or mineral matter, the same being the product of the material from which said vinegar is manufactured. And all vinegar shall be made wholly from the fruit or grain from which it purports to be or is represented to be made, and shall contain no foreign substance and shall contain not less than four per cent, by weight, of absolute acetic acid."

It appears by the testimony that the defendant, a Michigan corporation doing business at Grand Rapids, on February 5, 1898, sold a barrel of vinegar to one John T. Owens of Benton Harbor. The sale is admitted. A sample of the vinegar was taken from this barrel and analyzed by the State analyst, Mr. Fred H. Borradaile. The correctness of this analysis is not disputed. This analysis showed that the vinegar did not comply with the requirements of the statute in that it did not contain the amount of solids nor the amount of ash or mineral matter required.

The contentions made by counsel for defendant mostly relate to the validity of the act.

1. It is contended that the title to the act does not express any

object: that the act was intended to prevent deception in the sale of vinegar or to prevent adulteration of vinegar, but that no such object is expressed in the title; and that the act is therefore in conflict with section 20 of article 4, of the constitution of this State, which provides that: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title."

We think this contention sufficiently answered by what was said by this court in Soukup v. Van Dyke, 109 Mich. 681. There the title was: "An act relative to justices' courts in the city of Grand Rapids." It was said: "The title is sufficient if it fairly and reasonably announces the object and that is a single one. If this requirement be observed, the legislature must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the object of a statute and how much particularity shall be employed in the title in defining it."

In People v. Kelly, 99 Mich. 82, the title under discussion was: "An act relative to disorderly persons, and to repeal," etc.

See also:

State v. County Judges, 2 Iowa, 280.
McAunich v. The Miss. & Mo. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 342.

2. Counsel contend that the complaint being drawn under section two of the act, no conviction can follow; that if any violation of the law be found, it is of section one and not of section two of the act; that, therefore, the complaint was drawn under the wrong section.

This contention cannot be sustained. It is plain from the reading of these sections that the legislature intended that all fermented vinegar should come up to the required standard, whether made from fruit or grain.

3. The defendant contends that the act is unreasonable and therefore void as beyond the police power of the State, in that the test for cider vinegar in regard to solids is arbitrary, unscientific and not calculated to accomplish the end sought by the legislature, viz.: To protect the public health against spurious vinegar; that such test is no test, because:

a. Said solids and ash are indifferent ingredients of vinegar from a hygienic stand point.

b. Their comparative absence or presence is not an essential ingredient of pure apple cider vinegar.

c. A vinegar can be manufactured which will satisfy the requirements of the statute and yet contain no materials from apples or the product of apples.

d. A pure apple cider vinegar is frequently made which is below the requirements of the statute in solids and ash.

e. The less proportion of solids is a proof of greater purity in the vinegar and of its better keeping qualities.

These questions might very properly be addressed to the legislature, but are matters with which the court has nothing to do. It is not a part of the functions of the court to investigate the facts entering into questions of public policy merely. Under our system that power is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that branch to determine primarily what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health or the public safety.

Barton v. McWhinney, 85 Ind., 481.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 660.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S., 685.

In People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 92, it was said by this court: "The act may work hardship in many cases, but that question is one to be addressed to the legislature and not to the courts."

The question of the reasonableness of the acts found in many states relative to the sale of milk below a certain standard has been frequently raised in the courts, and the acts upheld.

In Com. v. Evans, 132 Mass, 11, the court passing upon such a statute, said: "The intention of the legislature and the practical operation of this section in connection with the third section is to provide that it shall be unlawful to sell milk containing less than thirteen per centum of milk solids. This belongs to the class of police regulations designated to prevent frauds and to protect the health of the people, which it is within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact."

In State v. Smyth, 14 R. I. 100, the court said: "It was the purpose of the statute to prohibit, not only the dealing in milk which had been adulterated, but also in milk of such inferior quality as to fall below the standard named in section three. It is equally a fraud on the buyer, whether the milk which he buys was originally good and has been deteriorated by the addition of water or whether in its natural state it is so poor that it contains the same proportion of water as that which has been adulterated." See also:

State v. Newton, 45 N. J. L., 469.
Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y., 509.
State v. Campbell, 64 N. H., 403.
10 Am. St. Rep. 419.

But counsel contend that the reasonableness of this act is a question of fact for the jury to determine from the expert chemical evidence.

This question is neither for the court nor the jury to determine. In People v. Clipperly, 101 N. Y. 634, that very question was discussed and decided adversely to the claim here. It was said: "The defendant takes the broader ground that the legislature cannot under the constitution prohibit the sale of milk drawn from healthy cows which in its natural state falls below standard fixed by the act, unless such milk, or the articles made from it, are in fact unwholesome or dangerous to public health. How is that question of fact to be determined? The court cannot take judicial notice whether milk below the standard is or is not unwholesome or dangerous to public health. Is that to be a question for the jury? If so, the court must charge a jury in each case that if they find milk below that standard to be unwholesome, then the statute is constitutional; if they find it to be wholesome, then the statute is unconstitutional. Evidently a constitutional question cannot be settled, or rather, unsettled in that way. The constitutionality would vary with the varying judgments of juries."

In the emery wheel case before us, in People v. Smith, 108 Mich., p. 534, a somewhat similar question was discussed. It was said: "If the courts find the plain provisions of the constitution violated, or if it can be said that the act is not within the rule of necessity in view of facts of which judicial notice may be taken, then the act must fall; otherwise it should stand."

See also:

People v. Girard, 145 N. Y., 109.
(45 Am. St. Rep. 595.)

4. Counsel also contend that defendant was not allowed, nor could it obtain, a sample of the vinegar in question for analysis, and was deprived of the right to produce evidence as to the amount of solids in the vinegar; and was thus deprived of property without due process of law.

The record shows that the defendant was not prevented from getting a sample of the vinegar by any person interested in the prosecution of the suit. The record shows that the only effort it made to get such sample was a letter written to Mr. Owens who had bought and paid for the vinegar, requesting him to return it, to which the

defendant received no reply, and it does not appear that Mr. Owens had any of the vinegar left at that time. No sample was left with the defendant by the prosecution; nor was this necessary.

Com. v. Coleman, 157 Mass., 460.

5. This statute forbids the manufacture and sale of vinegar not in compliance therewith; and persons manufacturing or selling vinegar below the standard do so at their peril. It is no defense that the person so manufacturing or selling vinegar below the standard has no knowledge that it is not within the standard prescribed.

People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 86; 71 N. W. R., 497.

We have examined the other questions raised, but do not deem it necessary to discuss them. They relate mostly to offers of testimony which the court below ruled out; and, we think, properly.

The testimony was uncontradicted that the vinegar sold was not in compliance with the statute. The sale was admitted.

The court was not in error in directing the verdict. The conviction must be affirmed.

Grant, C. J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. DETTENTHALER.

GROSVENOR v. JACKSON CIRCUIT JUDGE.

(Opinions filed December 6, 1898.)

Constitutional Law—Passage of Act Without Enactment Clause—Constitutional Provision Mandatory—Addition of Clause by Governor—Act 76, Laws of 1897, Invalid.

1. The provision in the Michigan State constitution, found in Sec. 48 of Art. IV, that all laws shall be styled, "The People of the State of Michigan enact," is mandatory and the passage of an act without the enactment clause renders the act invalid.
2. The addition of the enacting clause by the Governor before affixing his signature will not render the law valid which was passed without an enactment clause.

3. Act No. 76, Laws of 1897, being "An act to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter" held to be invalid because of the passage of the act without an enactment clause was not rendered valid by the addition of such clause by the Governor before affixing his signature to the act.

Error to the superior court of Grand Rapids; Edwin A. Burlingame, judge.

Exceptions taken by Frank J. Dettenthaler from a conviction of a violation of the pure food law.—Reversed and no new trial.

Frank D. Rodgers, Prosecuting Attorney, (Rodgers, McDonald & Corwin of counsel), for the people.

Rood & Hindman and E. F. Sweet, for respondent.

Certiorari by Elliot O. Grosvenor, Dairy and Food Commissioner. to review the action of the Jackson circuit judge in denying a mandamus. Affirmed.

John G. Hawley and Benn M. Corwin, for relator.

Rood & Hindman and E. F. Sweet, for respondent.

Hooker, J.: These cases involve the validity of act No. 76, Public Acts, 1897, which is as follows:

"An act to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter."

Section 1. The People of the State of Michigan enact, That no person by himself or his agents, or servants, shall render or manufacture, sell, offer for sale, expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any article, product or compound made wholly or in part out of any fat, oil or oleaginous substance or compound thereof, not produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, which shall be in imitation of yellow butter produced from pure unadulterated milk or cream from the same: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form, and in such manner as will advise the consumer of its real character, free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to look like butter.

Sec. 2. Whoever violates any of the provisions of section one (1) of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, and the costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail, or State House of Correction

and Reformatory at Ionia, for not less than six months nor more than three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court for each and every offense.

Approved April 15, 1897.

The evidence in the first entitled cause shows that the defendant was convicted of the alleged offense of selling oleomargarine in contravention of this act.

In the other a complaint was made of a similar act to a justice, who refused to issue the warrant, and on application the circuit court denied a mandamus to compel it. The cases raise substantially the same questions, and were argued, and will be considered together. The validity of the law is questioned. The record shows that this was a senate bill and passed the senate without the constitutional enacting clause. The records of the house show that the bill was reported by the committee on agriculture and the committee of the whole, without amendment, and with the recommendation that it be passed. Under the head of "third reading of bills upon passage," the record of the house shows that "pending the third reading of the bill, Mr. Chamberlain moved that the bill be recommitted to the committee of the whole, which motion did not prevail. The bill having been read a third time, and the question being upon its passage pending the taking of the vote, Mr. Graham demanded the previous question. The demand was seconded. The question being, 'Shall the main question be now put?' The same was ordered. The bill was then passed, a majority of all the members elect voting therefor, by yeas and nays as follows: * * * yeas 56, nays 19." As this is the only time the bill was before the house, we must find that the bill passed the house without an enacting clause, unless the contrary can be shown by other evidence. Counsel undertook to show that it was amended in this particular, by the records of the senate, and the testimony of the clerk of the house. The evidence is in brief, that previous to the passage of the bill in the house the clerk noticed the absence of the enacting clause, and brought it to the attention of the house, and said that he would enter one, and accordingly wrote the words in the original bill, i. e., the one which was then before the house. He did not testify that the house took any action upon it, or that any record was made of it.

The senate record shows that the bill was subsequently returned to the senate, accompanied by a letter from the clerk of the house, reading as follows:

"House of Representatives,
"Lansing, April 7, 1897.

"To the President of the Senate:

"Sir—I am instructed by the House to return to the Senate the following bill: Senate bill No. 6, file No. 24, entitled

"A bill to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter' and to inform the Senate that the House has amended the same as follows: By inserting in line 1, Section 1, after the words 'Section 1,' the words 'The People of the State of Michigan enact.'

"Very respectfully,
"LEWIS M. MILLER,
"Clerk of the House of Representatives.

"In the passage of which, as thus amended, the house has concurred by a majority vote of all the members elect."

It further appears that the Senate concurred in such amendment. We must determine, therefore, whether the house is shown to have amended the bill by inserting an enacting clause and if not whether the law is valid without it.

The most that can be claimed is that there is oral testimony, that the clerk announced its absence and stated that he would supply it. Inferentially perhaps we may say that there was no objection made, but the evidence is silent as to what, if anything, occurred. There is nothing but this inference of silence which imports acquiescence in the amendment. There is nothing to show definite action by the house which alone had power to amend the bill before it. So that if the clause is essential to the validity of the act we need not discuss the propriety of admitting parol evidence to prove an amendment which should be shown by the record if one was authorized.

See Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich., 391.
Hart v. McElroy, 72 Mich., 446.
Sackrider v. Supervisors, 79 Mich., 66.

Is the constitutional enacting clause a requisite to a valid law? This must depend upon whether the constitutional provision is to be considered a mandatory provision or directory merely.

See Constitution, Art. IV., Sec. 48.

Among the authorities cited by the relator in support of his contention, is that of Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268. The constitutional provision is similar to ours, and it was held that a substantial compliance was sufficient. In that case the style of the resolution was:

"Resolved by the legislature of the State of Mississippi." The court was unable to discover a previous judicial decision of the question, but quoted Mr. Cushing to the effect that the prescribed "form must be strictly pursued, and that no equivalent language will be sufficient," and while declining to accept his rule said: "It is necessary that every law should show on its face the authority by which it is adopted, and promulgated, and that it should clearly appear that it is intended by the legislative power that enacts it that it should take effect as a law. These conditions being fulfilled all that is absolutely necessary is expressed. The word 'resolved' is as potent to declare the legislative will, as the word 'enacted.' "

The case of McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, held that the provision of the constitution of Maryland was directory, and that the omission of the words, "by the general assembly of Maryland," did not render the law invalid. The question appears to have been treated as a new one.

The case of Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 427, follows the Maryland case, in holding the provision directory; the court saying that after diligent search, no case holding to the contrary had been found. In this case, like the one before us, the entire enacting clause was wanting. In this connection we may add that previous decisions of the same court, holding the provision that writs should run in the name of the state, was directory, were given weight. In our State a contrary holding will be found.

See Forbes v. Darling, 94 Mich., 621.

There are, however, cases which take a contrary view of the law, and adhere to the doctrine asserted by Mr. Cushing, and the late Mr. Justice Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 6 Ed., p. 93, viz.:

"But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims and fix those unvarying rules by which all departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct, and if it descends to prescribing mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the

proper dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of ordinary legislation. We are not, therefore, to expect to find in a constitutional provision which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument, which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised, in that time and mode only; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially when, as has already been said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as possible to implication."

There are some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory statutes has been applied to constitutional provisions, but they are so plainly at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points considered that we feel warranted in saying that the judicial decisions as they now stand do not sanction the application.

The question arose in Washington territory over a law fixing the seat of government, and the opinion of Cushing was quoted and followed. 1 Wash. Ter. 116. The case of Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nevada 250, decided in 1875, did the same. An extended discussion of the subject will be found in that case, in support of the proposition that the language of the constitution should be literally followed.

The opinion concludes with the following pertinent and emphatic language:

"Our constitution expressly provides that the enacting clause of every law shall be 'The People of the State of Nevada, represented in senate and assembly, do enact as follows.' This language is susceptible of but one interpretation. There is no doubtful meaning as to the intention. It is, in our judgment, an imperative mandate of the people in their sovereign capacity to the legislature, requiring that all laws to be binding upon them shall, upon their face, express the authority by which they were enacted, and as this act comes to us without such authority appearing upon its face, it is not a law."

The case of the State v. Patterson, 98 N. C. 662, is strong in its condemnation of the practice of treating constitutional requirements as directory. The case of Powell v. Jackson, 51 Mich. 130, is not in

point, as the bill was duly and seasonably amended, if we may accept the statement of the briefs of the counsel and the syllabus.

The trend of the weight of the authority is in our opinion against the relator's contention.

It is urged with some plausibility that the insertion of this provision previous to the signature by the Governor is a sufficient compliance with the constitution, from which we understand the claim to be made that although the enacting clause was wanting when the bill came to the Governor it might have been supplied by him. But it is thought that this proposition is tenable only upon the assumption that the constitutional provision is directory merely. The Governor has no power to make laws. The legislative power is in no part vested in him, being by Sec. 1, Article IV, of the constitution, vested in the senate and house of representatives. It is not the design of the constitution that he should legislate. His office is a check upon the legislature and he may compel a reconsideration of a bill by seasonably returning it to the appropriate house with his objections to it, and when the legislature has adjourned his neglect to sign it prevents it from becoming a law, but he has not the slightest power in framing the law. Indeed, it is a fundamental principal in American constitutions that the executive shall not make laws. The following language from the opinion in the case of state of Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Neb. 250, is apropos to this subject:

"Without the concurrence of the senate the people have no power to enact any law. Every person at all familiar with the practice of legislative bodies is aware that one of the most common methods adopted to kill a bill and prevent its becoming a law, is for a member to move to strike out the enacting clause. If such motion is carried the bill is lost. Can it be seriously contended that such a bill, with its head cut off, could thereafter by any legislative action become a law? Certainly not. The certificates of the proper officers of the senate and assembly, that such an act was passed in their respective houses, do not, and could not impart vitality to any act which, upon its face, failed to express the authority by which it was enacted."

This being so, the only justification for the insertion of the enacting clause by the Governor is to be found in the assumption that it is a clerical omission of an unimportant matter and it might as well be held that one of the houses, or a clerk, or even the printer of the laws, might make the correction, as that the Governor might do it.

Some of the states have sustained laws without enacting clauses, but we do not know of one that has made their validity depend upon the unauthorized action of some officer or person. They have preferred to rest their action upon the well recognized distinction between mandatory and directory provisions. If the provision is mandatory that the law shall have a prescribed style and the making of laws is confined to the legislative branch of the government, it cannot be consistently held that omissions of essential parts of a law may be supplied and corrections made by persons without authority; and the public necessities should be much greater than in the present case, before such a proposition should be seriously considered. If on the other hand there is warrant for treating the provision as directory, a much less dangerous precedent is established. But as has been shown, the weight of authority forbids it, and in our opinion it will be an unfortunate day for constitutional rights when courts begin the insidious process of undermining constitutions by holding unambiguous provisions and limitations to be directory merely, to be disregarded at pleasure. In the present case it will be much better that the legislature shall correct its mistake, than that the courts shall sanction the irregular correction.

We are therefore constrained to hold that the law under discussion is void, and in the certiorari case the order is affirmed, in that of Dettenthaler the conviction is reversed and no new trial ordered. The other justices concurred.

GROSVENOR v. DUFFY.

(Opinion filed September 18, 1899.)

Pure Food Law—Sale of Oleomargarine Colored to Imitate Butter—Constitutionality of Act.

The sale of oleomargarine colored with a harmless substance to imitate June butter, but which is sold and purchased as oleomargarine, is not in violation of section 3 of Act 118 of the Public Acts of 1897, being an act to prohibit and prevent adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture and sale of articles of food and drink.

Certiorari to review the action of the Washtenaw circuit judge in refusing the application of Elliot O. Grosvenor, Dairy and Food Com-

missioner, for mandamus to compel John L. Duffy, justice of the peace, to issue a warrant. Affirmed.

Smedley & Corwin, for relator.

John J. Speed and J. P. Lee, for respondent.

The relator presented to a justice of the peace a complaint in writing, charging that "Casper Rinsey did unlawfully offer and expose for sale, and did unlawfully sell and deliver to said Elliot O. Grosvenor, a large quantity, to wit, one pound of oleomargarine, which was then and there an article of food intended to be eaten by man, and which was then and there adulterated within the meaning of act No. 193 of the Public Acts of Michigan for the year 1895, as amended by act No. 118 of the Public Acts of Michigan for the year 1897, in this, to wit: that said oleomargarine was then and there an imitation of another article of food, to wit: an imitation of a rich June butter; and said oleomargarine had been and was then and there colored, whereby inferiority was concealed and by which means it was made to appear better and of greater value than it really was, to wit, in this: That it was thereby made to appear like butter of a grade which was then and there of a greater value than the said oleomargarine; that the said oleomargarine was labeled 'oleomargarine' and stamped with the seller's name; and that the tub and wrapper which contained the same bore the name and address of the manufacturer and was distinctly labeled oleomargarine'."

"Said complainant on his oath aforesaid, further says, that he called for oleomargarine, and that the said oleomargarine was sold to him as oleomargarine the same as to an ordinary customer, freely and without objection, and that for this reason he did not take the steps required by section 6, act No. 154 of the Public Acts of Michigan for the year 1897."

The justice refused to entertain the complaint and issue a warrant, whereupon the relator applied to the circuit court for Washtenaw county for the writ of mandamus to compel the justice to issue a warrant and proceed to hear the case. The circuit court refused the writ and the case is brought to this court by certiorari for review.

Grant, C. J. (after stating the facts). The title of the act reads "An act to prohibit and prevent adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture and sale of articles of food and drink." Sec. 3, as

amended by act No. 118, Public Acts 1897, so far as it applies to this case, reads:

"An article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act: * * *

"Fourth—If it is an imitation of, or sold under the name of another article. * * *

"Sixth—If it is colored, coated, polished or powdered, whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is.

"Seventh—If it contains any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health: Provided, That nothing in this act shall prevent the coloring of pure butter: And provided further, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to mixtures or compounds recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, if each and every package sold or offered for sale, bear the name and address of the manufacturer and be distinctly labeled under its own distinctive name, and in a manner so as to plainly and correctly show that it is a mixture or compound, and is not in violation with definition fourth and seventh of this section."

It is not claimed that the sale made by Rinsey violates subdivision seven. The act charged in the complaint is neither adulteration, fraud nor deception under any definition of these words to be found in any dictionary. Adulteration is "the act of corrupting or debasing, the act of mixing something impure or spurious with something pure or genuine, or an inferior article with a superior one of the same kind."

Bouv., L. D., 126.
Century Dictionary.

Counsel do not urge that it comes within the word "fraud" or "deceit." Neither is it urged that the article is made to appear of greater value than it really is. It is not claimed that the coloring matter used is in the least deleterious. The law permits its use to color butter. Counsel rely upon People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 86. That case is not in point. The gravamen of the offense there was that the article of food was damaged, inferior, its inferiority concealed, and it was made to appear of greater value than it really was.

This brings us to the only question we need to determine, viz.: Is the title to the act broad enough to include the sale complained of? Would any person reading the title to the bill in the legislative jour-

nals, or elsewhere, suppose that the bill would make criminal an act which in itself was entirely harmless, honest, innocent and contained no element of wrong-doing? Or that it would change the well known definition of a word so as to include within it things which were in no sense akin to it and which could only be included in it by the most arbitrary legislative enactments? Would a manufacturer of, or dealer in butter or oleomargarine, be notified by the title that the harmless coloring of either was not only to be prohibited but to be punished by fine or imprisonment or both? There can be but one answer to these questions. When the legislature attempts to change definitions and to make acts criminal which per se are innocent and contain no element of wrong, there must be something in the title to show such purpose or object under Sec. 20, Art., 4 of the constitution. The title contains not even an intimation that an entirely innocent act is to be made a crime. It follows that this part of the act is void.

Bissel v. Wayne Probate Judge, 58 Mich., 237.
Northwestern M'fg Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, Id., 381.
McKellar v. Detroit, 57 Mich., 158.

This statute is assailed as unconstitutional upon other grounds. This disposal of the case renders it unnecessary to discuss them. How far the legislature may go, under the police power inherent in the State in prohibiting and punishing acts which in themselves are perfectly harmless, would be an interesting subject of inquiry, but as it is not necessary to a disposal of the case we decline to enter upon it.

Judgment affirmed. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. SKILLMAN.

(Opinion filed March 4, 1902.)

Pure Food Law—Section 5022 C. L. Construed—Action Against Traveling Salesman.

A traveling salesman for a wholesale grocery firm, residing out of the State, took an order in this State for pure fruit jelly and forwarded the order to his employers. The order was filled with imitation fruit jelly. Information was filed against the salesman under section 5022 C. L., regulating the manufacture and sale of imitation fruit jellies. *Held*, That respondent was not guilty of violating the terms of the statute.

Error to the circuit court for Muskegon County. Fred. J. Russell, judge.

Appeal of John Skillman from a conviction under the pure food law. New trial ordered.

Chas. B. Cross, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Elliot O. Grosvenor and Smedley & Corwin, for respondent.

Moore, J. : An information was filed against the respondent which, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows: "That one John Skillman heretofore, to wit; on the sixteenth day of September, A. D. 1901, at the city of Muskegon, in the county of Muskegon aforesaid, did unlawfully offer for sale and did sell to Albert Towle a large quantity, to wit: a certain compound under the name of Quince Jelly which was then and there adulterated within the meaning of the act No. 193 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan of the year 1895, as amended by act No. 118 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan of the year 1897, as amended by act No. 117 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan of the year 1899, in this to wit: That said compound was then and there made and composed in part of glucose, starch and other substances, and was then and there colored in imitation of fruit jelly contrary to the form of the statute."

After the testimony was all in, a motion was made asking the judge, for various reasons, to direct a verdict in favor of respondent. This motion was overruled. The case was submitted to the jury which returned a verdict of guilty.

A great many errors are assigned. We think some of them which we shall discuss are well taken, but as the case if ever tried again, will not present the same questions now presented by counsel we deem it unnecessary to pass upon all the questions argued by them in the briefs.

To sustain the case of the people testimony in substance as follows was introduced: It was shown the respondent had for some years been a traveling salesman in the employ of Reid, Murdock & Company of Chicago, that he solicited an order from Mr. Towle, a grocer in Muskegon, that Mr. Towle gave him an order for a case of assorted pure fruit jelly. Mr. Skillman did not have the goods with him, but reduced the order to writing in the presence of Mr. Towle at his store, and forwarded it to the house in Chicago, It is as follows:

"Reid, Murdock & Co., Chicago,
Sept. 12, 1901.

Name: Albert Towle.
Town: Muskegon.
State: Michigan.
Ship by Barry Line.
Salesman, Skillman.
1 c P. F. Jelly Med. Asst..... 100
1 c P. F. Jelly Med. Currant..... 100
60 days."

"1 c P. F. Jelly Med. Asst." was explained to mean one case pure fruit jelly medium size assorted glasses. Mr. Towle testified Mr. Skillman claimed it was pure fruit jelly for which he took the order, and that was what he intended to buy. It was not shown that respondent had anything further to do with the transaction than as above stated. Later a case of goods was received from Reid, Murdock & Company and testimony was given tending to show that a tumbler of this jelly was sold to Mr. Bennett, inspector of the Dairy and Food Department of Michigan, and by him forwarded to the State Analyst, where it is claimed upon analysis it was shown to be a mixture of fruit juice, glucose, starch and coloring matter. Upon the cross examination of Mr. Towle the following occurred:

"Q. Did you give Mr. Skillman more than one order for fruit jelly about this time? A. Well, he had two or three orders, I think, two at least.

"Q. Two orders? A. One of them might have been ordered by mail.

"Q. Now you received two consignments of fruit jelly from the orders you had given to Mr. Skillman? A. I think so, yes, sir.

"Q. Upon which one of these orders did you receive this particular tumbler of jelly that you afterwards sold to Mr. Bennett? A. I couldn't say. The one that he bought was out of that order I think. (Witness pointing to order exhibited.)"

The defense claimed that the label "pure fruit jelly" placed upon the tumbler analyzed was put there by mistake. It was their claim that Reid, Murdock & Company dealt in two kinds of jelly, those made out of pure fruit and those made in imitation of pure fruit, and that when the imitation was sold in Michigan and certain other states their instructions were to label them "imitation," and that these instructions were furnished in writing to their agents, including the respondent, and they offered testimony tending to prove this claim.

The written instructions were also offered in evidence, but with the testimony offered were excluded by the court.

Among other requests offered by the respondent was the following:

"Under the undisputed evidence in this case there is nothing to show that the respondent offered to sell any jelly in violation of any statute of this State, but, on the contrary, it is shown that respondent offered to sell strictly pure fruit jelly and sent such an order to Reid, Murdock & Company of Chicago, Illinois, and the charge in the information for selling and offering to sell adulterated jelly is not sustained by the evidence, and your verdict should be not guilty."

The judge refused to give this request, but charged the jury, "It is recognized by the legislators and is a matter of common knowledge that many of the wholesalers that are doing business in Michigan are not residents of this State, so the legislature saw fit to make a law where a man solicited the sale of pure jellies, took an order for the sale of pure jellies, and in response to that order and offer, a different class of goods was furnished, that the party should be guilty of violating this particular law. In other words, instead of that order or offer and the furnishing of goods delivered to the party by a party who might be a non-resident of the State, that it should relate to the man who actually made the offer, the man who actually took the order for the furnishing of this particular article. The people claim that this is the matter in which this defendant here is liable."

This statement of the law is sought to be justified by People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 86, and People v. Grocer Co., 118 Mich. 604, 71 N. W. 497, 67 Am. St. Rep. 449, 77 N. W. 315. A reference to these case will show that the respondent in each of them admitted making the sale of the goods. In this case the respondent denies that he sold any goods coming within the provisions of the statute. Giving the only interpretation to the testimony as it appears in the record which can be fairly given to it shows Mr. Towle was solicited to give an order for pure fruit jelly. He gave such an order. It was reduced to writing and in the writing the jelly was described as pure fruit jelly. As before stated the only connection of the respondent with the transaction as shown by the record is the taking of an order for an article not within the terms of the statute and forwarding it. This does not constitute an offense. It might as well be urged that if a traveling salesman takes an order for Michigan beet sugar and forwards a written order for such sugar, and if the house, instead of filling the order as written, sends glucose with a label upon the pack-

age containing it calling it Michigan beet sugar the salesman would be guilty of an offense. This we do not understand to be the law. Upon the case as made the circuit judge should have directed a verdict of not guilty. People v. Howard, 50 Mich. 242, 15 N. W., 101.

The verdict is set aside and a new trial ordered.

Long, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

THE PEOPLE v. MORSE.

(Opinion filed June 3, 1902.)

Pure Food Law—Sales by Agents—Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Principal.

1. A traveling salesman who in good faith takes an order for "pure pepper," which is filled by his principal with impure pepper, is not guilty of a violation of Public Acts 1895, No. 193, forbidding the sale of impure foods.
2. Public Acts 1895, No. 193 (Pure Food Laws) Sec. 17, providing that the taking of an order for future delivery of any of the articles covered by the "act shall be deemed a sale, within the meaning of the act," does not make an agent absolutely responsible for the acts of his principal in filling the orders taken by such agent, and an order by the agent which is filled by the principal as an entirety may be, under the act, a sale of impure food, as to the principal, and yet not such as to the agent.

Error to circuit court, Muskegon county; Fred J. Russell, judge.

John W. Morse was convicted of a violation of the pure food law, and he brings error. Reversed.

Underwood & Umlor, for appellant.

Chas. B. Cross, Prosecuting Attorney, and George S. Lovelace, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for the People.

Hooker, J.: The brief filed on behalf of the people states that the case is similar to that of The People v. Skillman, 8 Detroit Legal News, 1090, 89 N. W. 330, and in effect concedes that the case must be reversed if we adhere to our former decision.

The defendant took an order for some pepper, as and for pure pepper, to be shipped to a dealer in Muskegon, by defendant's principal, a wholesaler in Chicago. The pepper when sent was not pure.

It is insisted that the Skillman case is at variance with the weight of authority elsewhere, and contrary to our own cases, in which it is said that we have held that a guilty intent on the part of a vendor, is not essential to an offense, under the pure food law (Public Acts 1895, No. 193). It is further said that in the decision in the Skillman case, section seventeen of the act must have been overlooked or considered unconstitutional.

The transaction in which the order was taken did not involve an immediate delivery of pepper, then and there present. It is not shown that the sample, if there was one, was the same as the pepper subsequently sent, or that it was in the least impure. If it be conceded that the agent acted in good faith, and we understand that it is not questioned, he took an order for pure goods, and in doing that certainly committed no offense. It is now urged that the exigencies of the enforcement of this law are such, that we should hold that this innocent and lawful action, may be made a crime by the subsequent act of the principal, either intentional or inadvertent, in departing from, instead of performing the contract which his agent had innocently made. We think this is not so, and we are also of the opinion that this does not necessarily do violence to section seventeen. This transaction, as an entirety, may have been a sale of impure pepper under the statute as to the principal, and not as to the agent. If the order had been taken, with knowledge on the part of the agent of a practice to send impure pepper on such orders, a different question would be presented.

The judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered.

Long, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. ROTTER.

(Opinion filed June 24, 1902.)

Food—Oleomargarine Act—Constitutional Law—Statutes—Title—Object.

1. Public Acts 1901, No. 22, entitled "An act to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter," which in addition to forbidding sale of imitation butter, prohibits sales of colored oleomargarine, is not, on that account, open to the objection that the object is not expressed in the title, as required by Const. Art. 4, Sec. 20.

2. The act is not in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.
3. The act is a valid exercise of the police power.

Error to circuit court, Emmet county; Frank Shepard, judge.

George W. Rotter was convicted of selling colored oleomargarine, and brings error. Affirmed.

Smedley & Corwin, Sears, Meagher & Whitney (James F. Meagher and Kay Wood, of counsel), for appellant.

Horace M. Oren, Attorney General, and Matthew F. Guinon, Prosecuting Attorney for the People.

Hooker, C. J.: At its last session, the legislature passed an act under the title, "An act to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter." Public Acts 1901, No. 22.

Section 1 of said act provides that:

"No person, by himself or his agents or servants, shall render or manufacture, sell, offer for sale, expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any article, product or compound made wholly or in part out of any fat, oil or oleaginous substance or compound thereof, not produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, which shall be in imitation of yellow butter produced from pure unadulterated milk or cream of the same: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form, and in such manner as will advise the consumer of its real character, free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to look like butter."

Section 2 prescribes a penalty for the violation of the act.

The defendant was a grocer in Emmet county, and is shown to have sold a package of oleomargarine, which by an analysis was proven to have contained artificial coloring matter, and that said oleomargarine was not made wholly from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, and that it was made in imitation of yellow butter, produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same. The court was asked to direct a verdict of not guilty upon the grounds:

1st. That the object of the act was not expressed in the title, as required by section 20 of article 4 of the constitution of this State;

2d. That the act violates the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and article 6, section 32, of the constitution of this State;

3d. That it was not within the police power of the State.

The evidence conclusively shows that no deception was used in selling the oleomargarine, and there is nothing to indicate that there was any harmful ingredient therein, but that, on the contrary there was not such ingredient. The defendant was convicted, and the case is here on exceptions before sentence.

It is contended that the title to the act indicates that the act was designed to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter, while the act attempts to go further and prevent all sales of such colored oleomargarine.

If oleomargarine colored yellow, closely resembles yellow butter, made from milk or cream, it cannot reasonably be said not to resemble or imitate yellow butter. Butter is a well known commodity. From time immemorial it has had but one origin, viz.: from the churning of milk or cream. Whatever may be said of the possibility of making a product from other compounds than milk or cream that shall closely resemble or be chemically identical with butter, the world has but one understanding of what is meant by the word "butter," and we must assume that such is the sense in which our legislature used the term. Compiled laws, Sec. 50. Sub. 1.

A fair inference from this statute is that the legislature undertook to prevent deception, by preventing the sale of any yellow oleomargarine, and it undertook to accomplish this by the most effective means, viz.: by prohibiting the coloring of oleomargarine yellow, thereby avoiding the embarrassment which would otherwise arise from the necessity of proving in each case, that deceit was used in selling it, as and for butter. We think this is fairly within the title, whatever must be said of the other points raised. We are referred to the case of N. W. Mfg. Co. v. Chambers, 58 Mich. 381, 25 N. W. 372, 55 Am. Rep. 693, as conclusive upon this question, in which case it is said that "all that could be done under such a title would be to prohibit and prevent sale of such articles under false pretenses." We are of the opinion that this language is too restrictive, and that it is at variance with the settled doctrine in this State, that any provision, naturally calculated to accomplish the object expressed in the title may be included in the act.

See:

Soukup v. Van Dyke, 109 Mich. 681.
People v. Worden Grocer Co., 118 Mich. 607.

The case cited was rightly disposed of upon another ground, and it is possible that the language above quoted should be considered a dictum. Moreover the cases are distinguishable for whereas, that act attempted to prevent all sales of imitation butter, and was therefore perhaps inconsistent with the title, which apparently contemplated lawful sales, the statute under consideration in the present case, does not prohibit sales of oleomargarine, which is not tainted with the prohibited ingredients.

It is unnecessary to discuss the other points at length for the reason that the uniform trend of judicial opinion is that such laws are valid.

State v. Meyers, 42 W. Va. 825; 35 L. R. A. 844.
New Hampshire v. Marshall, I. L. R. A. 51.
Powell v. Penna, 127 U. S. 678.
People v. Armsberg, 105 N. Y. 113.
Butler v. Chambers, 36 Minn. 69.
People v. Worden Grocer Co., 118 Mich. 604.
People v. Armsberg, 105 N. Y. 123.
State v. Crescent Creamery Co., 86 N. W. 107.
State v. Ball, 46 Atl. Rep. 50.
Commonwealth v. Van Dyke, 13 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. 484.
Commonwealth v. McCann, 14 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. 221.
Armour Packing Co. v. Snyder, 84 Fed. Rep. 136.
Cap. City Dairy Co. v. State, 22 Sup, Ct. Rep. 120.
Wright v. State, 41 Atl. Rep. 795.

We are of the opinion that the legislature had the power to pass this law, and its wisdom of policy is not for our consideration.

The judgment is affirmed and the court directed to sentence the defendant.

Long, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. PHILLIPS.

(Opinion filed Sept. 17. 1902.)

Food—Adulteration—Statutes—Oleomargarine—Yellow Butter.

1. The phrase "yellow butter," is used in Act No. 22, Acts 1901, making it an offense to sell or offer for sale oleomargarine colored in imitation of "yellow butter" made from pure milk or cream, of the same, means any butter produced from pure milk or cream thereof having a "perceptible shade" of yellow.

Error to circuit court, Kalamazoo county; John W. Adams, Judge.

John W. Phillips was convicted of selling oleomargarine, in violation of Act No. 22, Acts 1901, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Frank E. Knappen and E. M. Irish, for appellant.

Sheridan F. Master, Prosecuting Attorney, and Dallas Boudeman, for the people.

Moore, J. The respondent was convicted of having on hand with intent to sell, and offering for sale oleomargarine, colored in imitation of yellow butter, contrary to the provisions of Act No. 22 of the legislature, passed at the session of 1901.

It is claimed by respondent this law is unconstitutional and is an invalid law. That question was decided in the very recent case of People v. Rotter, against the contention of respondent, and need not be discussed here. It is urged as a matter of defense, and we quote from the brief of counsel, "that the statute is only aimed against the imitation of a substance which the legislature recognizes as yellow butter, and

1. The court should take judicial notice that all butter with a trace of yellow in it is not the yellow butter of commerce.

2. That if this is not true as a proposition of judicial notice, and the court cannot know it, then the respondent should have been allowed to prove, if he could, that there was such a usage of commerce.

3. That the statute is vague and indefinite in not defining the elements of the statutory crime it attempts to carve out of an act innocent per se, in that it gives no standard for determining what the color of yellow butter is that is not to be imitated."

The trial judge charged the jury upon that branch of the case as follows.

"It is not necessary in this case for the people to bave proved that the respondent himself colored the oleomargarine if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was colored. The offense is just as complete, so far as this is concerned, if the respondent purchased oleomargarine colored, as above indicated. The offense as above stated consists of having the oleomargarine colored as before indicated, in his possession, with intent to sell the same, or in exposing it for sale; and if the respondent sold it in the same condition as he bought it, there would be no defense in this case. The respondent, gentlemen of the jury, is not charged in this information with selling this article; and if you find beyond a reasonable doubt he sold it as claimed by the people in the testimony offered, you may consider this fact on the ques-

tion of whether respondent had or did not have the article in his possession for the purpose of selling it. And you must not consider it for any other purpose. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent did sell the article mentioned in the information to the parties claimed by the people, that would satisfy the statute upon the question of intent to sell. It is not necessary in this case to entitle the people to a conviction, that the oleomargarine should have been colored to represent any particular kind of yellow butter. That is, such yellow butter as the statute mentions, and as I have indicated to you the statute mentions. If the coloring was put into it, and by using such coloring the oleomargarine was in imitation of light yellow butter, such as the statute mentions, that is, yellow butter produced from pure, unadulterated milk or cream from the same, the offense is committed just the same, as if it had been colored to represent darker yellow butter. If you find it to have been oleomargarine and was colored in such a manner as to be in imitation of any kind of yellow butter, that would satisfy the statute upon the requirement of the question of color. Yellow butter I define to be any butter produced from pure, unadulterated milk or cream of the same having a yellow color.

"It is necessary in order for the jury to convict the respondent, for you to find beyond all reasonable doubt that the article in the package sold was colored in imitation of yellow butter produced from pure, unadulterated milk or cream of the same. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt under the testimony in this case that there was some coloring matter in this article, still if you find that there was not enough coloring matter in this article to cause it to look like yellow butter having a perceptible shade of yellow, said butter having been produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, then you must acquit. But if you find beyond a reasonable doubt there was coloring matter in said article and sufficient coloring matter in said article and sufficient coloring matter therein to make it look like yellow butter, having any perceptible shade of yellow, said butter having been made from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, that would be sufficient so far as the requirement of the statute upon the question of coloration is concerned."

We think this was a proper construction of the language used in the statute.

The conviction is affirmed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Long, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. JENNINGS.

(Opinion filed April 7, 1903.)

Adulteration of Food—Omission of Ingredients—Coloring Matter—Remarks of Court.

1. There not having been incorporated in the pure food law of 1895 (Public Acts of 1895, p. 358, No. 193), any specific formula for the manufacture of lemon extract, it is proper to resort to the United States Pharmacopoeia formula to determine of what lemon extract consists.
2. The pure food law of 1895 (Public Acts 1895, p. 358, No. 193), is not intended to prevent manufacturers of articles of food from improving the same, so long as no infringement of the law or spirit of the act defining adulteration takes place.
3. The provisions of Comp. Laws, Sec. 5012, that an article shall be deemed adulterated, "second, if any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it; third, if any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it"—should be read together, and the provision first recited construed as prohibiting the substitution for an essential ingredient of any cheaper or inferior substances.
4. Comp. Laws, Sec. 5012, declaring that an article shall be deemed adulterated, "sixth, if it is colored * * * whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is," does not preclude the use of coloring matter not injurious to health in any way.
5. It is improper for the court to refer to expert testimony as "boughten testimony."

Exceptions from Circuit Court, Muskegon County; Fred J. Russell, Judge.

Charles W. Jennings was convicted of violating the pure food law, and brings exceptions. Reversed.

Charles A. Blair, Attorney General, and Charles B. Cross, Prosecuting Attorney. (Cross, Lovelace and Ross, of counsel), for the People.

Knappen, Kleinhans & Knappen and L. N. Keating, for defendant.

Montgomery, J. This is a prosecution under the Pure Food Law, so called. The defendant was convicted under an information charging him with selling a compound as a lemon extract which was adulterated within the meaning of Act No. 193., P. A. 1895, and was a

compound in imitation of extract of lemon. The respondent was convicted and brings the case up on exceptions before sentence.

The evidence on the trial introduced by the defendant tended to show that lemon oil contains from three to ten per cent citral, so-called, and upwards of ninety per cent of so-called turpenes; that these turpenes represent the oil property; that they are in reality the oil itself freed from the citral; that citral is the principal flavoring and odor-bearing property of lemon oil; that the tendency of turpenes in the oil of lemon is to deteriorate or become rancid by long standing, and that because of this the extract or spirits of lemon in which turpenes appear in usual quantities become turpentiney, both in smell and taste, and that for this reason it is undesirable to have turpenes present; that the turpenes have a biting taste, easily developing a turpentine taste, not the true flavor of the lemon fruit. There was also testimony tending to show that this fact created a demand for turpeneless oils and that turpeneless lemon oils had been manufactured and sold commercially for a considerable time.

On the part of the prosecution the testimony of the chemist of the Pure Food Department was to the effect that taking as a standard of extract of lemon the spirits of lemon as defined by the United States Pharmacopoeia formula that the extract produced by the respondent showed no lemon oil present. It further appears that spirits of lemon made according to the pharmacopoeia formula would contain from 25-100 to 35-100 of one per cent of citral. It also appeared that 30 per cent of alcohol appeared in the product made by respondent, and that according to the pharmacopoeia formula 80 per cent was used, and that it cost less to make the extract using but 30 per cent of alcohol than if 80 per cent was used. It was also shown that a trace of coal tar dye was found in the extract made by respondent, but it was conceded that there was nothing whatever injurious in the extract as prepared by Mr. Jennings. The extract sold by respondent was made by what is known as the shaking out process, the purpose being to make an extract that contains no oil and as little alcohol as possible, a product that simply contains the flavoring properties of the lemon oil without the turpenes. This system has been employed by Mr. Jennings and by other manufacturers for the past three years; and it is claimed that all the elements and properties of lemon oil remained except the turpenes, and the testimony tended to show that the complete flavoring qualities are extracted by this process.

The circuit judge charged the jury as follows:

"In 1895 the Legislature of this State thought it wise to pass a law relative to the adulterations of food and food products. Perhaps there may have been some amendments since that time, but that was the foundation of the law. That law covers lemon extract as it covers all other products that are sold on the market. It seems at the time the law was passed and since that time there hasn't been—there isn't incorporated within that law any special formula for the manufacture of lemon extract. Now, we can hardly say, gentlemen of the jury, that at the time of the passage of that law that the legislature didn't have some recognized and defined standard by which these essences or extracts should be governed or controlled. I think it would be hardly fair to the legislature to claim that there wasn't a standard they had in their mind at that time, and for the purposes of this case I will instruct you gentlemen, that at that time and at this time this standard that appears here in the United States Pharmacopoeia is the standard recognized by the legislators of this State and the one to which—the one that is in force so far as it applies to the Pure Food Law of this State with reference to that particular product. And if this lemon extract is manufactured in confiict with that formula as I shall hereafter call your attention to it, and you should find from the evidence, why it would be your duty to convict the defendant here.

"By that formula it appears that it is necessary to have five per cent of lemon oil in the lemon extract and that lemon oil shall be cut by a sufficient quantity of alcohol to perform that act. Of course, you know that that means in common parlance it should dissolve the oil. In addition to that, as the evidence tends to show in this case, after those things are put together, the fluid, whatever it might be, would be nearly the color of water. As coloring there may be or should be five per cent of lemon rind, and those ingredients when added together would be lemon extract, and that, gentlemen, will be the standard as applied to the Pure Food Law of this State. Now, gentlemen, I don't mean by that statement that lemon extract cannot be manufactured by any other process except by that to which I have called your attention. I don't mean that. It is the claim of the defendant here that he has discovered a process by which be can manufacture lemon extract containing all of the qualities that lemon extract manufactured according to that formula would possess and not have entirely all of the ingredients in the first instance that are provided in the formula. And as I view this case, gentlemen, that is one of the important propositions in connection with this case—that, and the question of coloring—in the judgment of the court is the case, and that all of the testimony in the case here revolves itself about those two propositions.

"It is the claim of the defendant, as I say, he has discovered a process by which he can produce in this lemon extract all the qualities that would be produced by adding alcohol and lemon oil together, and that manufacturing it by that means he produces it chemically

by taking a larger quantity of lemon oil and extracting certain parts of it. Now, gentlemen, if you find and are satisfied by the evidence in this case that after this lemon extract was manufactured as defendant here claims he did manufacture it possesses all the qualities in strength and otherwise that it would possess if manufactured according to this formula, he is not guilty under this law. That is, he is not guilty of manufacturing an impure article, unless there are certain other articles that enter into the case to which I call your attention. As I say, in the first instance, it is claimed that according to the formula it should be alcohol and five per cent of lemon oil. Now if by some other process he can manufacture from the lemon oil and alcohol a product that would contain all of the elements that these two elements would contain if so mixed, he would not be guilty so far that would be lemon extract except the color of it.

"It is conceded here by all parties in interest, I think, that the only object of the lemon peel is to produce coloring. But there is another element to which the prosecuting attorney has called our attention. The evidence tends to show, gentlemen, that if this product is produced as claimed here on the part of the defendant, that after production by this process that the product would be nearly white. As I say, if it contained all of the elements of lemon extract, I don't think he would be guilty under this law, and if you are so satisfied, of course, at that point it would be your duty to find a verdict of not guilty unless there is some other matter in which he has violated this law.

"There is another provision of this Pure Food Law that provides that ingredients shall not be colored. In this case it appears that after this fluid substance is produced which he claims is just the same as produced under this formula, that he desires to change it to a lemon color. In other words, he puts in an ingredient which he claims would produce the same effect as this lemon rind. What is the object, gentlemen, or what was the object of Mr. Jennings adding this color? If the object was by any means to make it appear better or of greater value than it really is; if that was the object in adding that product of course it is your duty without any question to find this defendant guilty, because he hadn't any right to add that kind of a product or any other kind of a product to this fluid which he had produced and sell it for lemon extract, because that is a direct violation of one of the provisions of this Pure Food Law."

We think this charge presents fairly three questions for consideration: First, whether the pharmacopoeia formula is to be considered as defining lemon extract; second, if so, whether an omission of ingredients not essential to its purposes as a food product is a violation of the statute; third, whether the instruction relative to the addition of coloring matter should be sustained.

The statute defining what shall be deemed adulteration, so far as it relates to this case, declares that an article shall be deemed adulterated when: "First, if any substance or substances have been

mixed with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity; second, if any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it; third, if any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it; fourth, if it is an imitation of, or is sold under the name of another article; * * * sixth, if it is colored, coated, polished or powdered whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is; seventh, if it contains any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health." Compiled Laws, Sec. 5012.

We are agreed with the circuit judge that in referring to articles of food and to protect the users thereof the legislature must have had in view some standard, and as lemon essence or lemon extract had therefore acquired a well-defined meaning we incline to the view that it is proper to resort to the pharmacopoeia formula for the purpose of determining what lemon extract consists of. Does it follow from this that the legislature intended to prohibit improvement in the manufacture of lemon extract? If a means should be discovered by which a larger percentage of the flavoring quantity of the lemon might be extracted would it be an infraction of this law that the manufacturer should use such larger proportion of the essential ingredient of the lemon extract? We think not. We think it is open to manufacturers to improve a common article of food so long as no infringement of the law or spirit of the act defining what shall be deemed adulteraiton takes place. According to the proofs offered by the defendant it is very clear in the present case no substance or substances have been mixed with this extract so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity.

As to the second condition which amounts to adulteration the case is not so clear. This provides that if any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it, that it shall amount to adulteration. We think, however, this provision should be read in connection with the succeeding one, to-wit: "If any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it." So construed the provision prohibiting the substitution of any inferior or cheaper substance, wholly or in part, for it means the substitution for an essential ingredient of such cheaper or inferior substance. Now if it be a fact, as the testimony on the part of the respondent tends to show, that

it is a positive advantage to exclude the turpene wholly from the extract and to lessen the quantity of alcohol used, then the essential ingredients of lemon extract have not had substituted for them anything inferior or cheaper. We are aware that this view of the law may make it more difficult to establish the individual case, but as the statute is a penal statute it should receive a strict construction.

It follows from the views above expressed that the instruction of the learned circuit judge was erroneous inasmuch as the jury were told in effect that if *any* ingredient of lemon essence as defined by the pharmacopoeia was wanting in this extract sold by the respondent that there should be a conviction. We think the instruction should have been that if the lemon extract sold by respondent contained all the ingredients and in quantities such as prescribed by the pharmacopoeia which are adapted to use as food, and that nothing was eliminated except such ingredients as could be dispensed with without injury to the product as a food product there was no violation of the statute.

The only other provision of the statute involved is the sixth, which in effect prohibits coloring the article produced whereby damage or inferiority is concealed. The instruction upon this branch of the law was also erroneous if we are correct in our view of the main question. The elimination of non-essential ingredients from the extract certainly does not show damage or inferiority, and as the conceded facts are that the coloring matter employed was not injurious to health in any way this provision has no application.

The other questions discussed do not require special mention. It may be noted in passing that the circuit judge in referring to the testimony of expert witnesses spoke of it as boughten testimony. We think this expression was unfortunate. While it is proper for the jury to take into account the fact that expert witnesses are employed at an extra compensation paid them, the implication that the extra compensation necessarily amounts to a purchase of their testimony is hardly warranted; while the jury may consider this fact as bearing on their credibility, it is not proper that the court should intimate an opinion of that character.

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.

BENNETT v. CARR.

(Opinion filed July 14, 1903.)

Pure Food Law, Act 22, P. A., 1901, Construed—Sale of Yellow Oleomargarine.

Act No. 22 of the Public Acts of 1901 prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine except where it is "free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to look like butter," does not prohibit the sale of oleomargarine whose color is natural, genuine, and not an imitation, and the ingredients themselves naturally produce the color.

The term "ingredient," used in Act 22, Public Acts of 1901, does not refer to the ingredients essential to produce the article as defined by the legislature, but to an ingredient used to *produce* color.

Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Muskegon county, Fred J, Russell, Judge, to review an order denying the petition of John R. Bennett for mandamus to compel John M. Carr to issue a *warrant*. Order affirmed.

Charles A. Blair, Attorney General, and Cross, Lovelace and Ross, for relator and appellant.

Smith, Nims, Hoyt and Erwin for defendant and appellee.

Grant, J.: Relator is the inspector of the State Food and Dairy Department. On the 24th day of February, 1903, he made complaint before the defendant, a justice of the peace of the county of Muskegon, charging one Martin Aamondt with having sold one pound of oleomargarine contrary to act No. 22 of the Public Acts of 1901. The respondent refused to entertain the complaint and issue warrant, on the ground that the complaint stated no offense under the provisions of said act, and that said act is unconstitutional and void. Relator thereupon applied to the circuit court for the county of Muskegon for the *writ of mandamus* to compel the respondent to issue said warrant, and proceed with the examination. The circuit court sustained the action of the respondent, and the case is now before us for review upon *certiorari*.

The statute in question reads as follows:

"Section 1. No person, by himself or his agents, or servants, shall render or manufacture, sell, offer for sale, expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any article, product or compound made wholly or in part out of any fat, oil, or oleaginous substance or compound thereof, not produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, which shall be in imitation of yellow butter produced from pure unadulterated milk or cream of the same: *Provided*, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the manufacture

or sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form, and in such manner as will advise the consumer of its real character, free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to look like butter." The complaint charges Mr. Aamondt with unlawfully selling one pound of oleomargarine "made wholly or in part of fat, oil or oleaginous substance or compound thereof, as follows, to wit:

Water	11.75 per cent.
Butter fat	1.34 per cent.
Beef fat, lard and cottonseed oil	79.24 per cent.
Salt and other mineral matter	4.54 per cent.
Curd	3.13 per cent.

Said article, product or compound not being then and there butter produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, and being then and there in imitation of yellow butter produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, and not being then and there oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form and in such manner as would advise the consumer of its real character, free from coloration or ingredient that would cause it to look like butter, but that the said oleomargarine was then and there of a yellow color in imitation of butter, said color not being then and there produced by the addition of any artificial coloring matter, but said color being produced solely by the said ingredients therein contained, the said ingredients hereinbefore set forth having been selected and used in the manufacture of said oleomargarine in such manner and in such quantities and proportion as to produce the oleomargarine that was then and there in imitation of yellow butter produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, contrary to the form of the statute," etc.

The oleomargarine so purchased was manufactured in the city of Chicago, State of Illinois, by one Moxley, a resident of said city, and was sold by said Moxley to said Aamondt in the usual course of trade, and by said Aamondt was sold in the usual course of retail trade, in the same form and condition, and in the original package, in which it was received by Aamondt from Moxley.

It is conceded that this oleomargarine has a yellow color similar to butter, but the color is not produced by any artificial coloring substance or ingredient used for the purposes of coloration, but is produced solely by the selection and use, in proper proportions, of the substantial, recognized, legal and necessary ingredients of commercial oleomargarine.

Does the complaint state an offense covered by the statute? The

answer depends upon the construction to be given to the statute. The relator contends that the statute covers all products which look like yellow butter, and that it is immaterial whether such color is produced by some ingredient introduced for the purpose of causing the product to look like butter, or whether such color is produced by authorized and legal constituent food ingredients. The respondent contends that the statute is aimed only at the use of ingredients used solely for the purpose of producing the yellow color, and does not prevent the manufacture of an article whose color is natural, genuine and not an imitation. Penal statutes must be construed strictly and cannot be extended by construction beyond the intent of the act as expressed on its face. The conditions existing at the time the statute was enacted, and the mischief to be remedied, are important factors in construing penal statutes. Two acts covering the same subject must be construed as *in pari materia*, and, if possible, effect given to both. These are elementary rules of construction. At the time the statute in question was enacted the only method in use in causing oleomargarine to look like yellow butter was the introduction of some extraneous coloring matter. This was the mischief to be remedied. We clearly so understood in People v. Rotter, 9 D. L. N. 284; 91 N. W. Rep. 167, where, speaking through Chief Justice Hooker, we said of this statute: "The statute under consideration * * * does not prohibit sales of oleomargarine which is not tainted with the prohibited ingredient."

See also People v. Phillips, 9 Id. 393; 91 N. W. Rep. 616.

The legislature has defined oleomargarine which may be manufactured and sold in this State. Sec. 6, Act No. 147, Public Acts of 1899. It is conceded that the respondent has complied with this act. If we give the enlarged construction to the statute now in question, as urged by the relator, it follows that the legislature has prohibited the manufacture and sale of a valuable article of food, the natural color of which resembles yellow butter (itself almost universally colored by extraneous matter). The manufacturer of such a product, if he sold it at all, would be compelled to introduce some coloring matter so as to make it look unlike the yellow butter of commerce. These two statutes must be construed together. The article sold by the respondent is clearly authorized by the first act. The latter act does not in terms prohibit its sale and manufacture. It does prohibit the use of any substance for the sole purpose of producing yellow color. The use of such coloring matter was the sole

mischief then known to exist, and the only danger to be apprehended and guarded against.

A similar statute was passed in New Jersey, and the like contention was made to support a conviction, and the court said: "To construe the statute so broadly would render it practically prohibitive of the sale of all oleomargarine; for, of course, the compound must derive color from its ingredients, and such a prohibition has manifestly not been declared."

Ammon v. Newton, 14 At. Rep. 610; 50 N. J. 548.
McCan v. Commonwealth, 48 At. Rep. 470; 198 P. A. St. 509.

Our statute is copied verbatim from that of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court of that State, in a case just decided, has held that the statute applies only to extraneous substances or ingredients which cause the product to look like butter, and not to cases where the ingredients themselves naturally produce the color.

Commonwealth v. Himberg, ——— ———.

The Supreme Court of the United States so held in regard to the same statute.

Plumley v. Commonwealth, 155 U. S. 461.

The term "ingredient," used in the statute, does not refer to the ingredients essential to produce the article as defined by the legislature, but to an ingredient used to produce color. The maxim *noscitur a sociis* applies.

Under this disposition of the case it becomes unnecessary to discuss any constitutional question.

The order is affirmed.

The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. HARRIS.

(Opinion filed December 1, 1903.).

Food—Corn Syrups—Glucose.

1. Public Acts 1903, No. 123 forbids the sale of cane syrup or beet syrup mixed with glucose, unless the package containing the same be distinctly branded "Glucose Mixture" or "Corn Syrup," with the name and percentage of each ingredient contained thereon plainly stamped thereon. *Held*, That a sale of syrup made of 90 per cent pure corn syrup and 10 per cent cane syrup, labeled "Victor Corn Syrup," and truthfully stating the ingredients composing it, is not in violation of the statute, in that it is not branded "Glucose, 90 per cent, and cane syrup 10 per cent."

Exceptions from circuit court, Kent county; Willis B. Perkins, Judge.

Benjamin S. Harris was convicted of violating the "Act in relation to the sale of corn syrup" and brings exceptions. Reversed.

Respondent was prosecuted and convicted for a violation of Act No. 123 of the Public Acts of 1903, entiled "An act in relation to the sale of corn syrup," and reading as follows:

"Sec. 1. No person shall offer or expose for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, any cane syrup, beet syrup, or glucose, unless the barrel, cask, keg, can, pail or package containing the same be distinctly branded or labeled with the true and appropriate name; nor shall any person offer or expose for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, or sell any cane syrup or beet syrup mixed with glucose unless the barrel, cask, keg, can, pail or package containing the same be distinctly branded or labeled 'Glucose Mixture' or 'Corn Syrup' in plain Gothic type not less than three-eights of an inch square, with the name and percentage by weight of each ingredient contained therein plainly stamped, branded or stenciled on each package in plain Gothic letters not less than one-quarter of an inch square. Each and every package of syrup either simple or mixed shall bear the name and address of the manufacturer. Such mixtures or syrups shall have no other designation or brand than herein required that represents or is the name of any article which contains a saccharine substance; and all brands or labels required shall be an inseparable part of the general or distinguishing label, and that the general or distinguishing label shall be that principal and conspicuous sign under which it is sold.

Sec. 2. Whoever shall do any of the acts or things prohibited, or neglect or refuse to do any of the acts or things required by this act or in any way violate any of the provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment

in the county jail for a period of not less than thirty nor more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."

The complaint charges him with the unlawful sale of "a two-pound can, two pounds, of a certain article, product and compound, to-wit: corn syrup, so-called, made wholly or in part of cane syrup and glucose as follows, to-wit: Cane syrup ten per cent, and glucose ninety per cent, said can containing said article, product and compound sold as aforesaid not being then and there stamped, branded or stenciled with the name and percentage by weight of each ingredient contained therein, to-wit: cane syrup ten per cent, glucose ninety per cent; but said article, product and compound sold as aforesaid was then and there stamped and branded as follows, to-wit: 'Cane syrup ten per cent, corn syrup ninety per cent,' against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Michigan."

Respondent moved to quash the complaint and warrant for two reasons: (1) they charged no offense; (2) the act authorizes the use of the words "Corn Syrup," instead of Glucose in the statement of the ingredients placed upon the can. The motion was overruled and the case proceeded to trial upon the following agreed facts:

1. The respondent sold on October 12, 1903, at the city of Grand Rapids, Michigan, the can of Victor Corn Syrup in question.

2. The label on said can of syrup sold, as stated in the complaint, contains the formula of contents of said can as follows: "Corn Syrup, ninety per cent; cane syrup, ten per cent;" and is not branded or labeled as the people claim it should be, "Glucose, ninety per cent; Cane Syrup, ten per cent."

3. The Victor Corn Syrup in question is in fact composed of ninety per cent syrup made from corn, commercially called Glucose or Corn Syrup, and ten per cent of cane syrup.

4. Glucose contained in the Victor Corn Syrup in question is in fact a pure syrup made entirely from corn.

5. Grape Sugar, commercially known as Glucose, either solid or liquid, is a generic name for starch sugar as distinguished from the cane sugar.

6. A simple beet syrup is evidently the same as the simple cane syrup.

7. Originallly, Glucose, which was first made from grapes, was, for the reason that starch sugars are identical with the sweet principle of grapes, termed, for a great many years, and until lately was known chemically and commercially as Grape Sugar.

8. Commercially, Glucose is now made in this country entirely from corn, although abroad it is still made from potatoes.

9. The consuming public does not understand that Glucose is a syrup made entirely from corn. On the contrary, it is claimed by the respondent that the public generally supposes Glucose to be an inferior product made from animal fat, or a product of the glue factory, while they do recognize corn syrup as being made from corn.

10. Glucose as made from corn and contained in Victor Corn Syrup

in question, is entirely harmless and recognized generally by highest authorities as a valuable food product.

11. Glucose made from corn, in fact, costs, at the present time, owing partially to cost of raw material, more to produce, and sells for more in the markets, than manufactured cane syrup.

The court directed a verdict of guilty.

Grant, J.

Does the statute require respondent or manufacturers to state upon their labels that corn syrup consists of ninety per cent glucose? No such statute has come under the decision of other courts. It is a new question, and must be determined upon general principles of construction.

It is conceded that the label states the exact facts; that the article is made of ninety per cent pure corn syrup and ten per cent cane syrup; that it deceives no one; that Victor Corn Syrup is a valuable and pure article of food, and that the ingredient ninety per cent corn syrup "is entirely harmless, and recognized generally by the highest authority as a valuable food product," whether it be called glucose or corn syrup. The term "Glucose" is obnoxious to many, if not a majority, of the public, and is misunderstood by them. They do not know that in this country glucose is now made entirely from corn, and that the terms glucose and corn syrup are commercially synonymous. This fact is known to the manufacturers and perhaps the dealers. A prejudice exists against the term "glucose" because that material can be manufactured from many substances, including sawdust. In Europe it is made mainly of potatoes. By many it is associated with a glue factory. In this country corn syrup and glucose are not only commercially synonymous terms, but it is stated by counsel for respondent that they are permitted to be so used in all the other states. We have not verified this statement, but as it is not challenged we assume it to be correct.

We have, therefore, a valuable and healthful product, made from two pure, valuable and healthful ingredients, advertised and placed upon the markets for what it really is, without any deception, fraud or chance to injure the public in any way. Yet the contention on behalf of the people is that the legislature has enacted that in putting this product upon the market its manufacturers and sellers must attach to it a name obnoxious to the public, and, in fact, calculated to deceive them. When it is claimed that such innocent acts are made *malum prohibitum*, there must be either an express provision of the statute so declaring, or the language of the statute must leave no other conclusion reasonable. This statute does not expressly require it.

The argument on behalf of the people is "that glucose made from corn is glucose, the simple syrup mentioned in and intended to be mentioned in said act." The further claim is "that had there been any intention on the part of the legislature to use the terms 'glucose' and 'corn syrup' interchangeably and as synonymous then the term 'corn syrup' would have been enumerated as one of the simple syrups."

We do not think this reasoning at all conclusive. Prior to the enactment of this statute the law prohibited the sale of molasses, syrup or glucose unless distinctly branded or labeled with its true and appropriate name,—or any mixture thereof, unless it was branded or labeled "glucose mixture," and the per cent in which glucose entered into its composition. C. L., sec. 5024. The present act which repeals the provisions of the former act expressly permits the mixture to be labeled "glucose mixture," or "corn syrup." and forbids mixtures or syrups to have any other designation than required in the act so far as such designation "represents or is the name of any article which contains saccharine substance." It is a fair presumption that the legislature, in enacting this law, recognized the obnoxious character of the term "glucose" among the people, and permitted, and intended to permit, a mixture of corn syrup and cane syrup to be sold under the name of Corn Syrup. The title to the act provides for the sale of corn syrup, and in its body provides that when cane syrup is mixed with it, the manufacturers and dealers shall state the proportionate ingredients. The smaller amount of cane syrup used does not change the character of the general product, any more than salt changes the character of bread, or, sugar that of cake, and the act permits the sale of the mixture as corn syrup. Syrup, as defined by the United States Department of Agriculture, "is the product obtained by purifying and evaporating the juice of a sugar producing plant without removing any of the sugar." Syrup thus obtained from cane is cane syrup; syrup so obtained from sorghum is sorghum syrup, and syrup so obtained from corn is corn syrup. There is no reason why corn syrup should be labeled glucose, and until the legislature have so ordered in language susceptible of no other construction, the law must be held not to bear that construction.

Conviction reversed, and respondent discharged.

Hooker, C. J., took no part in the decision. The other justices concurred.

PEOPLE v. HINSHAW.

(Opinion filed January 5, 1904.)

Pure Food Law—Adulterated with Harmless Ingredients—Act 193, P. A. 1895, Construed.

The coloration of "Extract of Vanilla" with any substance to give it the appearance of greater strength is a violation of the pure food law, even though such coloring matter is harmless.

Act 193, P. A. 1895, as amended by Act 118, P. A. 1897, held constitutional.

Error to the Circuit Court for Saginaw County, B. A. Snow, Judge.

Appeal of Emory H. Hinshaw from a conviction under the pure food law. Affirmed.

Charles A. Blair, attorney general, and Frank A. Rockwith, Jr., and C. M. Browne, for the people.

Eugene Wilber for respondent and appellant.

Respondent was prosecuted and convicted of the unlawful sale of "Extract of Vanilla, which was then and there adulterated within the meaning of act number 193 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan of the year 1895, as amended by act number 118 of the Public Acts of 1897, in this, to wit: That said Extract of Vanilla was colored by the addition of a foreign coloring matter, to wit: coal tar dye, whereby its inferiority was concealed, and whereby said Extract of Vanilla was made to appear better and of greater value than it really was."

Two errors are assigned.—(1) that the court erred in instructing the jury; (2) that the act is unconstitutional as repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Grant, J.: 1. The instruction complained of is as follows:

"Now before the inferiority of an article can be concealed it must be necessarily first ascertained as to whether or not there is an inferiority in the article. If it is an inferior article and that inferiority is concealed by reason of the addition of foreign substance in this vanilla, and you are satisfied from the proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the fact, then he would be guilty, although he had no knowledge as to the foreign substance being in the bottle."

It appears that no such claim was made on behalf of respondent upon the trial; no request was asked covering the points now raised. The only objections shown by the record to have been made are,—*first*, that the title is not broad enough to cover the provisions in the amendment of 1897; *second*, that the legislature has no power to prohibit and punish acts in themselves harmless; *third*, that the act is unconstitutional.

Even in criminal cases it is the duty of counsel to call the attention of the court to the points on which an instruction is desired. People vs. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 311.

We, however, are of the opinion that the information charges the coloration to make an inferior article appear better and more valuable than it really was, and is sufficient; and also that there was evidence to sustain the allegation. The State Chemist testified that the effect of the coal tar dye was to make the article appear of greater value than it really is, and that the people would think it stronger than it really was. It is true, his testimony was weakened by cross-examination, but not sufficient to take the question from the jury,—especially in view of the fact that no other purpose than to make the article appear better, is shown.

II. The use of coal tar dye being harmless, counsel for respondent insists that the case comes within the rule of the recent case of People vs. Jennings, 94 N. W. R. 216; 10 D. L. N. 39. That case had not been decided when this case was tried. No such theory was advanced upon the trial. Even if it were, we, however, think the case is clearly distinguishable from People vs. Jennings. The color given to lemon extract, which of itself is almost colorless, is no indication whatever of the strength of the extract or its value. Its color is a mere whim or caprice of the trade, and no more indicates the character and value of the extract than does the coloring matter used to color butter, indicate its character and value. In this case Vanilla resembles the color of the bean from which it is produced. Its strength and value are judged to some extent at least, under the evidence in this case, from its color. No other object is apparent from the use of the coloring than to make it appear of a quality better than it really is.

III. It is urged that the act is unconstitutional on account of the proviso "that nothing in this act shall prevent the coloring of pure butter." This act is similar in its provisions to that involved in People vs. Rotter, 91 N. W. R. 167; and People vs. Phillips, Id. 616. The constitutionality of such acts was there sustained, and a discussion is unnecessary. Capital City Dairy Co. vs. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 246, is decisive of the question.

The conviction is affirmed.

The other justices concurred.

ABSTRACT OF LAWS.

The following is but a brief synopsis of the Dairy and Food Laws. The Digest and Rulings cover but a portion of the food and drink products affected by the statutes. Every article of food and drink comes within the law's regulation, and dealers are advised to examine the laws carefully and inform themselves fully.

IN GENERAL.

No person shall within this State manufacture for sale, have in his possession with intent to sell, offer or expose for sale, or sell, any article of food or drink which is adulterated.

The taking of orders, or the making of agreements or contracts, by any person, firm, or corporation, or by any agent or representative thereof, for the future delivery of any of the articles, products, goods, wares or merchandise embraced within the provisions of this act is deemed a sale.

Under this statute a dealer is liable for selling an adulterated article, although he may have no knowledge that the same is adulterated.

A guarantee of purity received from the manufacturer or jobber does not relieve a person handling adulterated goods from liability.

AN ARTICLE

shall be deemed to be adulterated:

1. If any substance or substances have been mixed

with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity.;

2. If any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it;

3. If any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it;

4. If it is an imitation of or is sold under the name of another article;

5. If it consists wholly or in part of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected, tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not, or, in the case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal;

6. If it is colored, coated, polished or powdered, whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is, except in the case of pure butter, which may be colored.

7. If it contains any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health.

MIXTURES OR COMPOUNDS.

recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food may be sold under the following restrictions:

1. All packages containing same must bear the name and address of the manufacturer or compounder thereof;

2. They must contain nothing injurious to health;

3. They must not be sold in imitation of, or under the name of another article;

4. They must be distinctly labeled under their own distinctive name, and in a manner so as to plainly and correctly show they are a mixture or compound;

5. A mixture or compound cannot be sold under the name of any ingredient contained therein, even though the words mixture or compound be used in connection therewith. It must be sold under an original or coined name.

Exceptions under the law are:

Buckwheat flour, coffee and lard, which may be mixed with other substances under certain restrictions and sold as buckwheat flour compound, coffee compound and lard compound.

DIGEST AND RULINGS.

Baking Powder.—All packages containing same must bear name and address of the manufacturer. Can be sold without formula, but if labeled cream of tartar, phosphate powder, etc., must be true to name.

Buckwheat Flour.—If labeled "Buckwheat Flour" must be true to name. Can be mixed with substances not injurious to health if labeled "Buckwheat Flour Compound" in letters not less than one-half inch in length followed with the name of the maker and factory and the location of such factory. Any other label or printed matter upon the package shall not be in contravention of the above requirements.

Butter.—Must be made exclusively of milk or cream. May be colored with coloring matter not injurious to health. Butter factories where milk or cream is purchased of, or contributed by, three or more persons must register with the Department on or before April 1 of each year. Renovated butter must be labeled as such. See ruling under head of Renovated Butter.

Candy.—Must not contain terra alba, barytes, talc, or other earthy or mineral substances, or any poisonous colors or flavors, or ingredients detrimental to health.

Catsup.—All packages containing same must bear the name and address of the manufacturer. Must contain no ingredients injurious to health.

Cheese.—Must be made exclusively of milk or cream. Only cheese made from milk from which no cream has been taken can be sold as, or branded, "Full Cream Cheese," or "Full Milk Cheese." Cheese factories where milk or cream is purchased of, or contributed by, three or more persons must register with the Department, on or before April 1 of each year. Authorized brands bearing the words, "Michigan Full Cream Cheese," may be obtained from

the Department upon payment of a fee of one dollar annually.

Coffee.—If sold as such must be true to name. May be mixed with chicory, or other substances not injurious to health, if marked or labeled "Coffee Compound," together with the name and address of the manufacturer or compounder, and have no other label of whatever name or designation. This applies to all packages containing such coffee whether put up for immediate delivery or for stock purposes.

Coffee Substitute.—Mixtures of cereals or other articles sold as substitute for coffee, must be sold as a mixture or compound under an original or coined name and not under the name of any ingredient contained therein All packages containing same must bear the name and address of the manufacturer or compounder thereof.

Canned Goods.—Must bear name and address of packer. If dried before canning must be labeled, "Soaked or Bleached Goods," in letters not less than two line pica in size.

Cream of Tartar.—Must be pure and true to name. Cannot be mixed or compounded with any other article and sold under the name of any ingredient thereof, even though it be labeled mixture or compound.

Extracts, Flavoring.—Bottles or packages containing extracts must bear the name and address of the manufacturer. Vanilla flavoring must be without artificial color. This includes all extracts of vanilla or tonka whether mixed or simple.

Extracts of vanilla and tonka may be mixed and sold as "Extract of Vanilla and Tonka," or simply "Extract of Tonka." The labeling of an extract of vanilla and tonka as "Extract of Vanilla" or "Compound Extract of Vanilla," with the per cent of each ingredient contained therein, is not proper, and will be considered an adulter-

ation. It must be understood that when an extract of vanilla and tonka is labeled with both names, the type used is to be similar in style and size, and that one name is not to be given greater prominence than another. So called extracts that are not made from the fruit, berry or bean, and are made artificially, such as raspberry, strawberry, pineapple, banana, etc., are prohibited by law.

Farinaceous Goods.—Must be true to name. Barley, Hominy, Cracked or Rolled Wheat or Oats, Tapioca, and like articles, must be pure and unadulterated. If mixed or compounded with other articles, must be sold as a mixture or compound, under an original or coined name, and not under the name of any ingredient contained therein. All packages containing mixtures or compounds of this kind must bear the name and address of the manufacturer or compounder thereof.

Honey.—Must be pure. Cannot be mixed with glucose or other substances and sold as "Honey Compound."

Jellies, Jams, Fruit Butters, etc.—Imitation fruit jellies, jams, preserves, fruit butters or other similar compounds made or composed in whole or in part of glucose, dextrine, starch or other substances, can be sold if uncolored, are not injurious, and are distinctly and durably labeled "Imitation Fruit Jelly, Jam, Preserves or Fruit Butter," with the name and location of manufacturer, and have no other label of whatever name.

Lard.—Imitation lard in manufacturers' packages must be distinctly branded or labeled either "Lard Compound," "Adulterated Lard," or "Lard Substitute," in letters not less than one inch in length, and shall be followed with the name of the maker and factory, and the location of such factory. If kept or sold in other than manufacturers' packages the name of the maker or factory is not necessary, but each and every package must be distinctly labeled "Lard Compound," "Adulterated Lard," or "Lard Substitute," printed in letters not less than one-half inch

in length. This also applies to smaller quantities when put up for immediate delivery.

Liquors.—Spirituous, fermented, or malt liquors must not contain drugs or poisons or ingredients deleterious or unhealthy. Persons engaged in manufacturing, rectifying or preparing same in any way must brand on each barrel, cask, or vessel containing the same, the name of the person, firm or corporation manufacturing, rectifying or preparing the same, and also the words, "Pure and without drugs or poison." No person shall sell at wholesale or retail any such liquors from any barrel, cask or vessel, unless the same shall have been branded and marked as aforesaid.

Maple Sugar and Maple Syrup.—Must be pure and true to name. Cannot be mixed with other sugar or syrup and sold as "Maple Sugar Compound" or "Maple Syrup Compound."

Milk.—Must contain not less than three per cent fat and twelve and one-half per cent solids. Milk from which cream has been removed must be labeled and sold as "Skim Milk." The sale of milk which is impure, unwholesome or adulterated, or from cows which are diseased, or fed upon the refuse of a distillery or brewery, of upon any substance deleterious to the quality of the milk, such as garbage, swill, or any substance in a state of fermentation or putrefaction, or from cows kept in connection with a family in which there is infectious disease, is prohibited. The addition of coloring matter or preservatives in milk is prohibited.

Molasses.—Each barrel, cask, can, keg or pail containing molasses, syrup or glucose shall be distinctly branded or labeled with the true and appropriate name of such article. Packages containing molasses mixed with glucose shall be branded or labeled "Glucose Mixture" and the per cent in which glucose enters into its composition. All brands or labels shall be in letters of not less than one-half inch in length and shall be in a conspicuous place.

Glucose and glucose mixtures shall have no other designation than herein required. Glucose mixtures must bear the name and address of the manufacturer. (See Syrup.)

Oleomargarine.—All compounds of animal or vegetable fats made in imitation or semblance of butter, or calculated to be used as or for butter, must be known and designated as "Oleomargarine."

The use of the name of any breed of dairy cattle, or the use of any words or symbols commonly used in the sale of butter, is forbidden in the sale, exposure for sale or advertisement of any oleomargarine.

Proprietors of any place where oleomargarine is sold or furnished must have conspicuously placed on the walls of the room where the same is sold or furnished, a white placard containing the words, "Oleomargarine Sold or Used Here" printed in black ink in plain Roman letters not less than three inches in length nor less than two inches in width. This applies to hotel, restaurant and boarding house keepers where oleomargarine is served

All packages containing oleomargarine must be branded as such in ordinary bold faced capital letters not less than five line pica in size, together with the name and address of the manufacturer and the name of each and every article or ingredient used or entering into its composition in ordinary bold-faced letters not less than pica in size.

Dealers must notify purchasers at the time of selling oleomargarine by verbal notice that the same is a substitute for butter, and must *also* deliver to the purchaser a separate and distinct label on which shall be printed in black ink in ordinary bold-faced capital letters, not less than five line pica in size the word "Oleomargarine," together with the name and address of the manufacturer and the name of each article used and entering into its composition in ordinary bold-faced letters not less than pica in size. This label must be delivered in addition to the label contained on the package in which said oleomargarine is wrapped for sale.

Oleomargarine must not contain artificial coloring matter.

Pancake Flour.—If containing more than one article must be sold as a mixture or compound under an original or coined name, and not under the name of any ingredient contained therein. Packages containing same must bear the name and address of the manufacturer or compounder.

Pepper.—All black pepper shall contain not more than six and one-half per cent ash or mineral matter; and shall contain not less than twenty-five per cent starch as determined by the diastase method; and shall contain not less than six tenths of one per cent nor more than one and three-fourths per cent of volatile ether extract; and shall contain not more than ten per cent nor less than six and one-half per cent of non-volatile ether extract; and shall contain not more than sixteen per cent of crude fibre.

Prepared Mustard.—Pure Mustard mixed with vinegar and spices may be sold if labeled "Prepared Mustard" and bear the name and address of the manufacturer, but if any substance or substances are added to cheapen it, such as flour, etc., it will be deemed adulterated. The label proper must contain the words "Prepared Mustard," and have no other designation than herein required. Printed matter descriptive of the goods will be allowed upon the label below the words "Prepared Mustard," or below the name and address of the manufacturer.

Renovated Butter.—All packages containing same sold, offered or exposed for sale, or in possession with intent to sell, must be labeled "Renovated Butter."

Packages put up for immediate delivery shall be covered by wrappers on which must be printed the words "Renovated Butter" in Gothic letters at least three-eighths of an inch square and such wrappers shall contain no other words or printing thereon, and said words "Renovated Butter" so printed shall not be in any manner concealed.

If packed in tubs or other receptacles the words "Renovated Butter" must be printed in Gothic letters at least three-eights of an inch square on two sides of the same.

If uncovered or not in a case or package a placard containing said words in the same form as above described shall be attached to the mass in such manner as to be easily seen and read by the purchaser.

Saccharine.—The use of saccharine in all food products is prohibited.

Syrup.—Syrup mixed with glucose must be distinctly branded or labeled "Glucose Mixture" or "Corn Syrup" in plain Gothic type not less than three-eighths of an inch square. It shall also have the name and percentage by weight of each ingredient contained therein plainly stamped, branded or stenciled on each package in plain Gothic letters not less than one-fourth of an inch square. Every package of syrup either simple or mixed shall bear the name and address of the manufacturer. It shall have no other designation or brand that represents or is the name of any article which contains a saccharine substance and all brands or labels shall be an inseparable part of the general or distinguishing label, which shall be that principal and conspicuous sign under which it is sold.

Spices.—Must be pure and true to name. Cannot be mixed or compounded with any other article and sold under the name of any ingredient thereof, even though the package be labeled mixture or compound. (See Pepper.)

Sweet Chocolates and Sweet Cocoas.—If containing no other substance than cocoa mass, and not to exceed 60 per cent of sugar and flavoring, will not be classed as a compound or mixture. They must be plainly and distinctly labeled sweet chocolate or sweet cocoa, and bear the name and address of the manufacturer.

Vinegar.—All packages containing vinegar must be branded with the name and address of the manufacturer. All vinegar must contain not less than four per cent by weight of absolute acetic acid and must not contain any preparation of lead, copper, sulphuric acid, or ingredients

injurious to health. All vinegar made by fermentation and oxidation must be branded "fermented vinegar," with the name of the fruit or substance from which the same is made, must be free from foreign substance and must contain not less than one and three-fourths per cent by weight of solids contained in the fruit or grain from which said vinegar is fermented, and not less than two and a half tenths of one per cent ash or mineral matter, the same being the product of the material from which said vinegar is manufactured. All vinegar made wholly or in part from distilled liquor must be branded "Distilled Vinegar," and must be free from artificial coloring matter. Only vinegar made from pure apple juice, free from foreign substances, drugs, or acids, and containing not less than one and three-fourths per cent by weight of cider vinegar solids, can be sold as apple, orchard or cider vinegar.

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